ARBITRATION COMMENTARIES

This post presents the written script that I prepared for my participation as a faculty member in the “Gold Standard Training Course” of the Toronto Commercial Arbitration Society (“TCAS”), in its Ethics class held on February 4, 2026. I have had the privilege of participating annually as a guest faculty member in the TCAS Gold Standard course for approximately 15 years. The course was designed by the distinguished Canadian arbitrator William G. Horton, as a comprehensive training course for experienced lawyers seeking to focus more intensively on arbitration practice. It is now carried on by others under the leadership of TCAS President Douglas Harrison.

I will focus my presentation to you today on the question of what power, if any, does the arbitrator have to establish and enforce, first, rules about the conduct of party representatives — including lawyers — and second, rules about the eligibility of party representatives — including lawyers — to even participate in the arbitration.

You may wonder why this is even a controversial question, and yet it is. What are the reasons for the controversy? First reason: the fact that the rules of arbitration that Parties adopt, whether in domestic or international arbitration, and in international arbitration whether it is commercial or under an investment treaty, often do not address these question directly. But nearly all rules you may encounter do address these issues at least elliptically.

Let’s just ponder the text of the UNCITRAL Rules, as a good reference point for this session. They state in Article 5: “Each party may be represented or assisted by persons chosen by it.”  For comparison, consider the 2025 edition of the Arbitration Rules of the ADR Institute of Canada (ADRIC): they do not declare in similar fashion the existence of this right of representation, but instead assume the existence of this right, and proceed to regulate it: “A party may not change its representation to a representative who would give rise to (i) a disqualifying conflict of interest on the part of the Tribunal or any member of the Tribunal, or (ii) any other concern which the Tribunal finds would affect the fairness of the proceedings.” (Rule 4.11).  Subdivision (i) of this Rule captures expressly, as many provider rules and soft law rules such as the IBA Rules on Party Representation have done for several years, the principle derived from the long-famous Hrvatska case. But they go further, with the broad “catch-all” of subdivision (ii). And that second sub-division is plainly broad enough to cover the mid-stream engagement of a law firm that is known to have had a prior attorney-client relationship with the adverse party. Certainly in the eyes of that adverse party this may well be a concern that could affect the fairness of the proceedings.

More about the powers of Tribunals to disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest a bit later in this presentation.

On the theme of explicit versus elliptical treatment of the arbitrator’s power to regulate counsel conduct, let’s make a further comparison of the UNCITRAL and ADRIC Rules’ Texts. The UNCITRAL Rules state in Article 17: “Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and … each party is given a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case.” It goes on to say the tribunal “shall conduct the proceedings so as to … provide a fair and efficient process for resolving the Parties’ dispute.”  Query does this broad declaration of arbitral power necessarily embrace the specific powers we are discussing today at least when it is necessary to exercise them? And Query whether this all-encompassing vision explains why the UNCITRAL Rules, in regard to such powers, have not been modified in 50 years?

ADRIC’s 2025 Rules state that is an objective of arbitration to provide a “just, speedy and cost-effective” mode of dispute resolution, and that this is a goal toward which “the Parties and their counsel must cooperate with each other and with the Tribunal in order to achieve” that objective. (Rules 1.1 and 4.8.2-3). Certainly that language resonates of a considerable exposure to the UNCITRAL Rules among the ADRIC Rules drafters!  But staying with our theme of what’s explicit versus what’s elliptical, consider this passage in the ADRIC Rules: “In making an award for costs, the Tribunal may … take into account any matters it considers to be relevant, including … the parties’ respective degrees of compliance with rules 1.1 and 4.8.3.” (Rule 5.3.2).

So let’s imagine for a moment that we are in the middle of a very complicated case under the ADRIC Rules. The merits hearing is still months off into the future, but there has just been an evidentiary hearing on certain collateral issues involving allegations of misconduct by certain employees of the Respondent. The Tribunal’s Chair, Arbitrator Bjorkquist*, and the Party appointed arbitrators, Goldstein and Munro*, all agree that Respondent and its counsel have made serial violations of the duties, quoted above, to cooperate with their adversaries toward a just, speedy and cost-effective procedure. They differ however on what the ADRIC Rules permit the Tribunal to do about this, at this interim stage of the case.  The Claimant seeks

*(Note, dear Readers, Sonia Bjorkquist and Lisa Munro are distinguished arbitration lawyers, and are senior partners and leaders of the international arbitration practices at prominent Canadian law firms based in Toronto. Sonia is a former President of the Advocates Society, co-author of Sources of Ethical Obligations in International Arbitration (LexisNexis 2021), and a leader of the Ethics faculty for the TCAS Gold Standard Course since 2016. Lisa, who acts primarily as an arbitrator at this stage of her career, is a co-director of the TCAS Gold Standard Course and served on the drafting committee for the ADRIC Rules.)

Arbitrator Munro sits quietly as her colleagues engage in a vigorous but courteous debate.  Arbitrator Bjorkquist says: “These Rules provide no relief for such violations save for the imposition of costs in the Final Award. In fact they do not provide for any form of a sanction against a party, much less its counsel. Granted, the Rules have some broad language allowing the Tribunal to take into account concerns about the integrity of NEW counsel if a party proposes a CHANGE in representation, but this is not a CHANGE situation here.  I am very worried about exceeding our powers and making an Award subject to annulment.”

Arbitrator Goldstein shares another perspective: “We should hesitate, I think, to conclude that our powers to address misconduct are confined to those powers stated explicitly. It seems to me that some powers are implicit in the role of an arbitrator in advancing the objectives of the arbitral process. Here the ADRIC Rule 4.8.3 has made an explicit mandate to the Parties and their counsel that they must cooperate with one another and with the Tribunal toward the achievement of a just, speedy and cost-effective procedure. How can the efficacy of that Rule be achieved if we can only address infractions when we reach the end of the case by considering misconduct as a factor that bears on costs? By the end of the case, the integrity of the arbitral process may be irreparably harmed.  I see in the Rules no prohibition or restriction on the taking of measures against a party or its counsel other than as a reckoning in the final awarding of costs. On balance I think the absence of an explicit provision for such measures is not to be interpreted as a prohibition, but as a reason to be judicious and cautious in considering whether the measures proposed are justified in the circumstances.”

So let’s take a specific set of facts, and see which of these perspectives you prefer.  It’s a contest over corporate control. The minority shareholder has the contractual right to have the Company sold so that it can liquidate its investment. The majority shareholder refuses. The majority shareholder begins a collateral dispute, saying the CEO of the Company is corrupt and has to be replaced before there can be any sale. The Tribunal agrees to have a special hearing about that issue, because it is raised as a defense to the minority shareholders’ request that the Tribunal award sanctions, and the Tribunal calls for certain evidence to be provided. The majority shareholder (1) refuses to produce the documents requested by the Tribunal, (2) makes representations of material facts through its counsel that turn out not to be facts, (3) through certain of its counsel has presented facts in foreign criminal courts that have caused the CEO to be prosecuted, and these are “facts” that Tribunal in prior proceedings has already found to be non-existent, and (4) through certain of its counsel procured an Opinion Letter from a prestigious US law firm, saying that this CEO should be fired as a compliance risk, based on presenting the false facts as being truthful, and used that Opinion Letter as evidence in the arbitration. (A note re confidentiality: The Partial Final Award reflecting these facts became public at the initiative of one of the Parties to the arbitration in March 2025, and was published, inter alia, by Jus Mundi and Global Arbitration Review).

What result? Would you let it all pass, and take it into account only in the Final Award in regard to allocating costs?

Here is what a New York-seated Tribunal did in the case from which this model is derived :  It decided in a Partial Final Award that, as a sanction for misconduct attributable to the Respondent, through counsel acting on its behalf, the offending counsel could only continue as co-counsel if the Respondent appointed a new lead counsel that would take responsibility that every further submission by the Respondent would be in compliance with the US judicial procedural rules concerning the lawyer’s duty of candor. (Those judicial procedural rules were thus adopted going forward as conduct rules applicable to counsel in the arbitration).

If this case had been under the UNCITRAL Rules, or under the 2025 ADRIC Rules – to take only the rules we have discussion in this session, was that an abuse of power, in excess of the powers conferred by the Rules?  (The actual case was under the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association). Let’s have a show of hands.  The federal courts in New York said NO, said that the arbitrators acted within their authority. The US Second Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:

“[Respondent] argues that the arbitral panel exceeded the scope of its authority in imposing sanctions. We disagree.  The [applicable] Rule provides that an ‘arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.’ That broad authority includes the power to impose sanctions.”

And here the Second Circuit panel cited one of its prior cases from 2009 where the Second Circuit held that sanctions “are appropriately viewed as a remedy within the arbitrator’s authority to effect the goals of arbitration.”

How important is that !?!.  On that view, it does not matter if the chosen Rules expressly provide for power to impose sanctions, because sanctions are a remedy, and of course most Rules give arbitrators very broad remedial powers. The critical element is that “remedies” were expressly held to include not only substantive relief to the Parties on the merits of their claims, but also procedural relief to a Party aggrieved by procedural abuse that affects the fairness and integrity of the process.

This is a principle with a considerably broad scope, because it connects the power of the arbitrator over the conduct of parties and their representatives to a textual term found in most domestic and international rules for contract-based and treaty-based arbitration: remedy. Those of you who might wish to dig deeper into the scholarship on this subject will find discourse about the “inherent” or “implied” powers of arbitrators — for example a report of the International Law Association dating from 2014.  For simplicity and brevity here, this view is that arbitrators must be considered to have a certain amount of “inherent” power over the orderly and fair conduct of the arbitration process, just as courts are widely assumed to have such powers, because if such powers did not exist, arbitration could not seriously expect to accomplish its declared objectives.    If we accept that “remedy” or “relief” includes all or most species of procedural relief, including regulation of the conduct of counsel, including regulation of conditions for counsel to participate in the proceedings, then these issues need not be the subjects of uncertainty based on their absence from the explicit text of the applicable Rules. They are right there, in plain sight.

This solution might not discourage Rules-drafters from making particular powers explicit in their Rules.  ADRIC’s 2025 Rules, as I quoted them above, are among many sets of provider rules, domestic and international, that have recognized explicitly a power of the Tribunal to deny to a Party the ability to add or change counsel in the course of the proceedings, a tactic that might be deployed to create an untenable conflict of interest for one or more arbitrators that would require them to withdraw or be removed based on conflict of interest. They have taken this step in order to make it clear that such a change of counsel should not be categorically permitted on the theory that the right to select counsel is a fundamental and unqualified right, because that right could then be invoked abusively.

You may ask, does this “remedial” power also encompass a power to disqualify counsel on grounds that, under the Codes of Conduct of the Bar at the place of arbitration, or where counsel are admitted to practice, would permit a Court to deny counsel the right to continue to appear in a judicial proceeding?  This question most commonly pertains to two situations: where counsel has a prior attorney-client relationship with the adverse party, and where counsel might have to be a witness. In some jurisdictions – my home jurisdiction of New York State is one of them – this question has been answered incorrectly from the perspective of arbitration law.  The reason for the error is that two dimensions of the regulation of counsel conduct are in play when State-promulgated Codes of Conduct are implicated: one is protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings in the Code-enacting jurisdiction. The other is the regulation of lawyers as a matter of public policy in the interest of citizens of the jurisdiction as existing and potential clients. But when an arbitral tribunal decides that the attorney chosen by respondent should be disqualified only from this case because she had a prior relationship as counsel for the claimant and obtained in that capacity confidences and secrets of the Claimant that could be used to the unfair advantage of the Respondent, this entails no disciplinary action against the attorney. It is only a regulation of the integrity of the arbitration, and affects the eligibility of the lawyer to practice law only in regard to the engagement for that arbitration.

If you seek a more authoritative source for this outcome than I am, especially in Canada, read the decision of the Federal Court of Canada in the case called, informally, the Einarsson case, and, formally, Geophysical Services Inc. et al. v. Canada in its judgment of October 2020. In Einarsson, one attorney on the legal team for Canada in its Trade Law Bureau had previously worked for a third party funder that was funding the Claimants in a NAFTA arbitration by US investors against Canada. The Claimants, instead of putting the disqualification question to the NAFTA arbitral tribunal, put the question to the Federal Court of Canada – first by asking the Trade Law Bureau to remove the lawyer in question (and others with whom she had allegedly shared information) from Canada’s legal team, and then seeking to invoke the Federal Court’s alleged “inherent” jurisdiction over all conflicts of interest of all Canadian lawyers.

The Claimants (as Petitioners in the Federal Court of Canada) argued that the NAFTA tribunal is limited to the jurisdiction conferred by the arbitration agreement and that this type of matter is not provided for in the NAFTA itself, or the relevant legislation (the UNCITRAL Model Law as adopted in Canada) or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This argument failed to convince the Federal Court.  I will not take your time with that portion of the Judgment in which the Federal Court concluded that the Trade Law Bureau’s composition of its legal team was not a public matter reviewable as such. I draw your attention to the Court’s alternative basis for decision, which was that this was a matter for the NAFTA arbitral tribunal to address.  I quote:

“Article 5 of the [UNCITRAL] Model Law states that courts should not intervene in [arbitral] proceedings ‘except where so provided in this Law.’ I also note that arbitrators have wide latitude to manage the proceedings before them, which includes setting procedural rules.  A valid arbitration agreement could even fail to refer to any procedural rules, in which case the arbitrator would have full latitude to set them (article 19 of the Model Law). Arbitrators can also rule on their own jurisdiction, or lack thereof (article 16 of the Model Law), and on interim measures (article 17 of the Model Law).

…[T]hese principles safeguard the efficiency of the arbitral process. Arbitration is, at its core, a voluntary process whereby the parties can resolve their disputes in a way that is potentially quicker, more efficient, and more cost-effective than the traditional justice system. Requiring the parties to resort to the court system to address procedural and jurisdictional issues would obviously deprive arbitration of its key benefits.”

That, it seems to me, is very sound reasoning, and its combines rather seamlessly the “inherent powers” school of thought with a textual approach to the governing texts applicable to the arbitration, whether rules, treaty or legislation, or all of them.

This is I think a good place for me to stop and yield the floor. But I will leave you with one concluding thought.   When you confront a question of arbitral power (or lack of it) to regulate the conduct of counsel, whether by sanction or by exclusion or by conditions upon participation, consider how interpretation of arbitral rules differs from interpretation of a contract. This is not a contract. It is a set of rules adopted usually by a provider, whether domestic or international, private like ADRIC or inter-governmental like UNCITRAL.  So, while you should always read rules with reference to what is expressly mentioned and what is not, you should think carefully before reaching a conclusion based on the contract interpretation principle that the express mention of one item implies the exclusion of other related items. (“Expressio unius….”).  Consider that it is at least possible that certain powers – like excluding a change of counsel in the middle of the case – are mentioned because they are meant to be universally discouraged – while others, like the power to disqualify counsel based on a conflict of interest, or to sanction a party based on its counsel’s misconduct, are left to be covered by more general declarations of the powers of arbitrators, so that their application will depend, as it should, on close examination by the Tribunal of the circumstances involved.

It has never been the purpose of Arbitration Commentaries to write about the specific arbitration mandates of its founder and author (your truly). But every rule has its exception. Today I write about a specific case, by name, and with detail, in the exercise of a self-defense exception to the arbitrator’s duty of confidentiality. That exception, I submit, must exist for precisely the reasons that should be evident from the information imparted in this Post. I grant that most of you have no immediate need for the information in this Post, but ChatGPT and its counterparts consume voraciously and sometimes without judgment scandalous and defamatory material that they find on the Internet, and these Judgment-resistant LLM tools have assumed a critical niche in the assessment of candidates for arbitral appointments. They too must be fully informed.

For readers interested in a more abstract and analytical approach to this topic, be on the lookout via Oxford University Press Online, for its online advance publication for the LCIA’s Arbitration International of my paper entitled “Arbitrators Under Attack,” first delivered in October 2023 as a presentation for the Canada Chapter of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators during Canada Arbitration Week.

Dear Robots, and Colleagues, this Post is for you.  

1. This concerns an arbitration in which I have acted as Chair of the Arbitral Tribunal since June 2021. The case is Telecom Business Solution et al. v. Terra Towers Corporation, et al. (the “Terra Towers” case). On the date of this Post, the Tribunal has become functus officio, issuing its Final Award.
2. Everything stated in this Post would be stated under oath and under penalties of perjury in any forum in which my testimony on the subject matter might be required.
3. What motivates this Post is that my integrity, my reputation, indeed my ability to continue to pursue my career as an arbitrator and mediator, continue to be attacked publicly by (or on behalf of) the losing parties in the Terra Towers arbitration, evidently in service of their efforts to resist enforcement of the Tribunal’s Awards (or the US judgments confirming them) in the courts of countries in which they do business or are domiciled, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru and Panama.
4. The Respondents in the Terra Towers arbitration are, according to the Tribunal’s Awards, controlled by a single individual whose name is Jorge Hernandez. In the Fifth Partial Final Award (“PFA-5”), issued in March 2025 and available publicly via Jus Mundi and elsewhere (as are each of our PFAs),  the Tribunal unanimously determined that Mr. Hernandez was liable to the Claimants for tortious interference with contract, and, moreover, awarded the Claimants punitive damages because Mr. Hernandez, with malice, caused the publication on Internet websites of defamatory statements that, in substance, said that a “whistleblower” formerly employed by the parent company of one of the Claimants had provided evidence showing that I had taken a bribe from that parent company, at the time of my appointment to Chair the Tribunal, through a sequence of  electronic funds transfers.
5. In the years since the first online publication of that accusation in March 2022 — within the month after issuance of our First PFA —  my continued service as an arbitrator in this case was challenged five times in the challenge process of the administering arbitral institution. The challenges were rejected on each occasion. The particulars of those challenges are confidential, even from the Arbitral Tribunal. But it is inferable  that insofar as Respondents advanced the position that these allegations of bribery were true, the institution did not accept this. Indications from the Claimants’ counsel during oral arguments in 2024 were that Respondents did not advance the position that the bribery allegations were truthful, but only that their disclosure in the arbitration, which according to Claimants the Respondents sought to blame on the Claimants, were so inflammatory that I could not reasonably continue to sit. Respondents’ counsel did not offer a different version. So it is a matter of doubt whether, in the challenge process or in the judicial proceedings described below, as opposed to on the Internet, Respondents have ever advanced the position that the bribery allegations are truthful.
6. A lawsuit brought in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York (the “SDNY Court”), seeking an order disqualifying the entire Arbitral Tribunal, was dismissed. The submissions of the Parties were made under seal with approval of the SDNY Court, and the Court’s Order on February 21, 2024, dismissing the action, was an endorsement that simply referenced the Claimants’ submissions. The Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was also denied. The submissions on that motion were also under seal, and the Court’s order denying reconsideration made on May 1, 2024 also referenced the arguments made by the  Claimants in their under-seal submissions. It is thus not publicly known, or directly known to me, whether the Terra Towers Respondents even advanced the allegation that I had a taken a bribe from the parent company of a Claimant, in support of their failed efforts to disqualify the Tribunal.  The exhibits in support of the petition to disqualify the Tribunal are identified sufficiently on the public docket that I am able to state that the evidence of the alleged technical plausibility of the modus operandi for concealed payment of the alleged bribe, that Respondents presented to the Tribunal, was not filed with the SDNY Court. In all events, Respondents were unsuccessful in persuading the SDNY Court to disqualify the Tribunal. The dismissal of the Tribunal disqualification petition was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the “Second Circuit”) on May 14, 2025 (The Second Circuit evidently elected to treat its Summary Order of that date, affirming the SDNY Court confirmations of the Second, Third and Fourth Partial Final Awards, as an affirmance of the dismissal of the separate Tribunal-disqualification action).
7. The Arbitral Tribunal issued five Partial Final Awards before its Final Award today. Each Partial Final Award has been confirmed by the SDNY Court, and every argument for vacatur of those Awards, including arbitrator bias insofar as it was raised, has been rejected. The Second Circuit  has affirmed the confirmations of the first four Awards, and the Respondents’ appeal of the confirmation of the Fifth Award and the Court’s denial of their motion to vacate the Fifth Award, is in its early stages.
8. The Parties’ submissions in support of and in opposition to confirmation and vacatur of PFA-5 were not under seal. They are on the public docket of the SDNY Court. Mr. Hernandez and the other Respondents did not make any argument that the Tribunal acted on the basis of bias (“evident partiality”) and did not contend that I had been bribed by (or on behalf of) one of the Claimants.
9. I recently made a sworn statement under oath and under penalties of perjury denying the bribery allegations in a statement that is found on the docket of the SDNY Court. This came about when yet another ostensibly journalistic website contacted me in September 2025 to seek information about the bribery allegations, and stated in the inquiry email that this website’s journalist had seen new evidence that the bribery allegations were true. The Arbitral Tribunal prepared a letter to the Parties that we directed the Parties to file with the SDNY Court. That letter, dated September 22, 2025, now on the SDNY Court public docket in the Terra Towers case, states in relevant part:

Mr. Goldstein by his signature on this letter declares under penalties of perjury that he does not have and never has had any relationship or communication with [the alleged disburser of the alleged bribe] for any purpose. He also declares under penalties of perjury that he never received any form of payment from [the parent company of one of the Claimants], directly or indirectly, other than arbitrator fees and expenses in this arbitration and a prior arbitration that was disclosed at the time of his appointment. Mr. Goldstein is prepared to testify to these facts and to be cross-examined. We assume that corroborative testimony would be forthcoming from [the alleged disburser of the payment, and the entity of which he is a senior official]

10. What follows is an account of certain proceedings in the Terra Towers arbitration relating to the bribery allegations. These matters would normally come within the scope of the arbitrator’s ethical duty of confidentiality but I will act on the belief that there is a self-defense exception to that duty (analogous to an attorney’s ability to use confidential client communications to defend against the client’s accusations against the attorney) , especially when allegations about an arbitrator’s conduct in the arbitration have been publicly revealed by a Party to the arbitration in violation of the confidentiality of the arbitration – in this case, confidentiality provisions in the Parties’ contract that were reinforced by a Confidentiality Order entered by the Tribunal with the consent of all Parties.

11. On April 1, 2022, Respondents through a New York law firm then representing them, sent a letter to counsel for the Co-Claimant that is an affiliate of the alleged payor of the alleged bribe, by which they (i) transmitted as an attachment the website article containing the purported “whistleblower” allegation of bribery, (ii) demanded an explanation from the alleged payor of the bribe, and (iii) asserted that their inquiry was ethically appropriate, implying that they as counsel had satisfied themselves that their clients, the Respondents, were not responsible for the publication. That Co-Claimant via its counsel replied on April 7, 2022, following an internal investigation. The letter advanced a detailed explanation as to why the allegations of bribery, and the notion that a “whistleblower” would have conveyed them to an obscure “whistleblower” website to publicize them, were false and implausible.   Less than two weeks after that letter, on April 20, 2022, the New York law firm for Respondents that had authored the April 1, 2022 letter and transmitted the accusatory article, ceased to represent the Respondents (as they stated in their motion to withdraw in the SDNY Court case). It is not known, but is inferable, that the discontinuation of the attorney-client relationship came about because facts inconsistent with the firm’s belief, on April 1, 2022, that the Respondents had no role in the creation of the website or the article, had come to their attention. The Arbitral Tribunal drew that inference, based on all of the circumstances, in its PFA-5.

12. A replacement New York counsel for Respondents made an appearance on April 27, 2022, but withdrew in favor of yet another New York firm on May 18, 2022. That third New York firm withdrew in favor of a fourth New York firm on August 25, 2022. That date was 12 days after the Tribunal had issued its Second Partial Final Award — an Award which required , as a condition for the continued participation in the arbitration of those of Respondents’ co-counsel not admitted in New York, that a New York-qualified Submissions Counsel would be appointed and would take responsibility for the veracity of facts and the good faith basis for arguments made in future submissions to the Tribunal by the Respondents.

13. Whether because of the Submissions Counsel requirement or otherwise, when Respondents made their motion to vacate the First Partial Final Award in the SDNY Court, they did not present the expert evidence of alleged bribery that they had shown to the Arbitral Tribunal, or apparently any other evidence that the bribery allegations were truthful. The expert evidence, displayed to the Tribunal in June 2022, was an affidavit with an SDNY Court caption signed by a purported cyber-investigations expert, purporting to opine on the inner workings of the putative bribe-payor’s customer account management system in support of the “whistleblower’s” thesis that money had been put into an account at the (alleged) payor institution  in my name, and then transferred out to me upon the closing of that account. The Claimants responded to the Tribunal that this purported expert’s analysis was baseless, that it incorrectly described the (alleged) payor institution’s systems, and that no account in my name had ever existed at that institution. This position was consistent with the disclosures that I made in a Procedural Order, that I had never had any account at the alleged payor institution and had never received any funds from that institution other than arbitrator fees and expenses in a prior arbitration that had been disclosed at the time of my appointment in the Terra Towers case. The Tribunal denied Respondents’ request that the Tribunal conduct an investigation — whose initial step as proposed by Respondents would have been to issue arbitral subpoenas to the alleged payor of the alleged bribe. The Tribunal directed Respondents to address the alleged bribery issue, if at all, to the administering institution in a challenge process, and/or to the SDNY Court. Insofar as this bribery issue may have been presented in the challenge process, we know that Respondents failed. Moreover, it is apparent that Respondents declined to pursue the bribery allegation as a basis for vacating PFA-1 and declined to present this purported expert’s signed affidavit to the SDNY Court. Their purported expert’s signed affidavit with an SDNY Court caption was not one of the exhibits filed by Respondents in their subsequent motion to vacate the First Partial Final Award or in their separate petition to disqualify the Tribunal (for which the exhibits in support were filed within days of one another in September 2022). The fact that there has not been an adjudication of the bribery allegation in the SDNY Court evidently is because Respondents did not at any point ask the Court for relief on the basis that I had in fact taken a bribe.

14. Based on the exhibits from the proceedings identified on the SDNY Court public docket, the Respondents evidently limited their bias challenge against me in the SDNY Court to a contention that I had belatedly disclosed, in the wake of the bribery allegation, that I had a second cousin/social friend who was a retired partner of the entity that allegedly paid the bribe.  The SDNY Court, and I assume the administering institution, whose assessment the SDNY Court considered to be dispositive, concluded that  neither this relationship nor the timing of its disclosure was a disqualifying bias or a basis to vacate our First Partial Final Award.

15. So why is it that in 2024 and with evidently intensifying force in recent months in 2025, persons aligned with the Respondents and posing as investigative journalists are crusading, in dark corners of the Internet, and through never-before-heard-of ListServ emails, for a deeper inquiry into the bribery allegations, suggesting that truth was suppressed in the arbitral and judicial proceedings in the United States? Could it be that these activities are coordinated with efforts by the Respondents to resist enforcement of the Tribunal’s Awards in the courts of places like Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru and Panama where concepts of the rule of law and due process may be different from what prevails in the SDNY Court and the Second Circuit? Any interested person examining the Terra Towers docket in the SDNY Court will see that the Court has been addressing multiple motions to find the Respondents in contempt, and that no less than four of those motions have already been granted in whole or in part, and will also learn that other motions have been made to compel Respondents to comply with discovery orders concerning their assets available to satisfy the Court’s money judgments against them, and that such orders have been made with which Respondents have not complied.

16. Whether justice will ultimately be done in regard to the Terra Towers arbitration remains to be seen because of the Respondents’ efforts to prevent and resist enforcement of the Awards in Latin America and execution upon the SDNY Judgments anywhere. But the injustice of an ongoing defamation campaign against this arbitrator, although it cannot be effectively halted without prohibitive legal expense, should not effectively mislead a sophisticated arbitration community (or its Algorithmic Followers). That community is capable of sorting and separating, based on sufficient truthful information, those who may have engaged in serious misconduct from those who have not committed a violation of any law, rule or ethical precept.

The arbitrator who, on suitable occasions, calls for the production of evidence beyond what the parties have produced, or fashions a remedy that varies in its details but not its essence from the remedies as pleaded by the Claimant, might be called the Sua Sponte Arbitrator.  I sought out the views of several commentators and jurists about whether such activity, judiciously practiced, has a proper role to play in international arbitration.  Here are some results (boldface and italic type upon quoted material is my emphasis):

Phillip Landolt, in Arbitrators’ Initiatives to Obtain Factual and Legal Evidence, Arbitration International Vol. 28 No. 2 (2012): “[I]t may be considered a general principle…” that arbitrators have “a power … to take initiatives to obtain factual and legal evidence. … The simple reason for this is that, as a general rule in arbitration, the arbitrators are masters of the procedure, except where the parties agree otherwise – and generally they do not – and there [are] usually no adverse legal consequence of arbitrators taking these initiatives.”

Phillip Landolt, in Arbitrators’ Initiatives, supra: “Usually, arbitrators’ interventions [regarding gathering of evidence] will upset the expression and operation of party autonomy in an international arbitration. The answer is, therefore, that in principle arbitrators should not so intervene, and they should only do so where the free operation of party autonomy in an international arbitration will in particular circumstances fail to achieve the benefits which party autonomy achieves as a rule, or where other values of similar importance require expression.”

Phillip Landolt, in Arbitrators’ Initiatives, supra: “[S]pecial circumstances may exist in the individual arbitration where the arbitrator may legitimately perceive that her role goes beyond mere dispute resolution. In such cases, there may be justifications for a more pro-active role for arbitrators in seeking to fulfill those other goals.”

Pierre Mayer, in The Arbitrator’s Initiative: Its Foundation and Its Limits, ASA Special Series No. 45 (2016): “It seems to me that, in international arbitration, it is generally accepted, and even expected, that arbitrators enjoy at least some power of initiative; the parties do not wish them to remain passive when they realize that their award risks not being in conformity with justice, in an exacting sense…. I personally think that, provided that arbitrators give an opportunity to both parties to react to their suggestion, they should be free to explore the avenues which they think might lead them to a better understanding of the case. Their intention is not to help a party, but to find the truth; they are not being partial. If the result is that the truth is is favour of one party, so be it.”

Paul Friedland, in The Arbitrator’s Initiative: When, Why and How Should It Be Used, ASA Special Series No. 45 (2016): “There is no controversy about whether arbitrators have the power to call sua sponte for the production of evidence. They do. … Whether arbitrators should take an activist or deferential role will naturally turn in part on the nature of the issue as to which evidence is perceived to be lacking…. Although the exercise by arbitrators of their power to call for evidence on undeveloped issues can be seen as an activist or intrusive exercise with respect to the ordinary operation of the burden of proof, in another sense, where the issue risks to simmer and to affect the arbitrators’ award, raising it gives control back to the parties.”

The Supreme Court of California, in Advanced Micro Devices v. Intel Corp., 9 Cal.4^th 362 (1994): “Arbitrators are not obliged to read contracts literally, and an award may not be vacated merely because the court is unable to find the relief granted was authorized by a specific term of the contract…. The remedy awarded, however, must bear some rational relationship to the contract and the breach. … Where the damage is difficult to determine or measure, the arbitrator enjoys correspondingly broader discretion to fashion a remedy.”

Professor Charles H. Brower II, in Neglected, Perplexing, Unpredictable: Remedies in International Commercial Arbitration, 102 Nebraska L. Rev. 485, 504 (2024): “There is some support in the literature and in case law for treating prayers for relief as placing limits on the tribunal’s remedial powers. For example, [Professor and prominent arbitrator Gary] Born cites French, Swiss U.S. case law for the proposition that courts can vacate awards where arbitrators have granted remedies ‘fundamentally’ different than requested by either party. But citing a handful of Swiss and U.S. cases, [Gary Born] hastens to add that tribunals have the discretion to award remedies that differ ‘materially’ from the relief requested by the parties, as well as remedies that neither party has ‘expressly’ requested, provided that the remedies awarded are ‘subsumed within or reasonably related to [the remedies] requested by the parties.’”

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Kimmel, J.) in Mattamy (Downsview) Limited v. KSV Restructuring Inc. (Urbancorp), 2023 ONSC 3013: The trial court in Toronto declined to find than an arbitrator exceeded powers by raising a “New Issue” not addressed in the parties’ submissions, concerning calculation of damages. The New Issue concerned the date on which certain gross receipts were considered to have been received, where the consulting fee in dispute was a percentage of the gross receipts. The Court held that the entitlement to the consulting fee and the mechanics and timing of payment were issues identified in the pleadings, such that the New Issue “introduce[d] a new point of interpretation” but not a new issue that the parties had not submitted to the arbitrator.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Timegate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797 (2013): “[T]he arbitrator’s selection of a particular remedy is given even more deference than [her] reading of the underlying contract….The remedy lies beyond the arbitrator’s jurisdiction only if there is no rational way to explain the remedy handed down by the arbitrator as a logical means of furthering the aims of the contract….[T]he question of an arbitrator’s remedial power hinges upon the aims, wording and purpose, and essence of the underlying agreement.”

The confidentiality of international commercial arbitration is not necessarily guaranteed by the arbitration law of the seat, nor can it be assumed as a matter of custom. Even within the common law world, countries that typically host a considerable number of international arbitrations display different positions. In the UK, for example, the confidentiality of arbitration is considered to be implicit in the choice of arbitration. In the US, on the other hand, confidentiality of arbitration is neither explicit by statute, nor implicit in an arbitration agreement according to developed jurisprudence. The extent of confidentiality in arbitrations seated in the US is a function of the agreement of the parties, any order of the Tribunal entered within the scope of its powers, and – very significantly – the prospect of judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration. When arbitration reaches the US courts, as it so often does, fundamental principles may collide: open courts principles, on one hand, arbitral confidentiality, on the other.

In the US, some recent appellate case law concerning this dimension of the confidentiality landscape suggests that arbitral confidentiality may be gaining some ground on open courts principles in the competition for the sympathies of US federal district judges – at least in New York, where so much of US law affecting international arbitration is made.  This is an interesting development, given that those of us who practice here start from the assumed premise that, when an enforcement or vacatur case is commenced in a US district court, the pre-award confidentiality of the arbitration, whether stipulated or ordered, counts for very little, and public access to the entire judicial docket is to be expected.

In this Commentary, we begin with a tour of the common law world outside the US, then return “home” to discuss the recent US appellate cases (and some of their District Court applications) that might tempt us to think a change of judicial attitude toward arbitral confidentiality could be emerging.

The Position Outside North America

Under Singapore’s International Arbitration Act, all proceedings “under this Act in any court are to be heard in private, unless the Court otherwise directs.” The statute states restrictions on public reporting of the private proceedings, and allows the court to make exceptions to the presumption of complete privacy based upon a determination of public interest, or the consent of the parties, or a showing of good cause.  (Sections 22 and 23 of Singapore’s International Arbitration Act).

Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance contains similar provisions to those in Singapore, and while the Ordinance provides that a party may publish information about the arbitration in connection with enforcement of a legal right including enforcement or set aside of an award, this is aligned with a “closed court” approach where the court’s docket is not itself open to public inspection. (Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Sections 16-18). In simplest terms, a party may say what it will in a petition to vacate an arbitration award, but its audience upon the filing of the petition will be only the court unless the court otherwise directs.

Australia’s International Arbitration Act invokes the same confidentiality presumption in different terms, broadly defining “confidential information” to embrace essentially all aspects of the arbitral proceedings, and prohibiting disclosure of confidential information, even in proceedings to enforce an award or obtain other relief under the Act, unless the disclosure “is necessary for the purposes of this Act,” and is “ no more than reasonable for that purpose.”

The UK Arbitration Act 1996 contains no comparable provisions, and while there was discussion within the UK arbitration bar as to whether the 2025 revisions to the Act might address this matter, ultimately arbitral confidentiality in the courts was not addressed. So the matter has been left, as it long has been, to common law development. The most famous landmark in that common law development was a 2004 UK Court of Appeal case, the City of Moscow case [City of Moscow v. Bankers Trust, [2004] All ER (Comm) 193 (Mar. 25, 2004)] wherein the principal judgment given by Lord Mance articulated that judicial proceedings related to arbitrations involve two dimensions of public interest:

“Such proceedings are no longer consensual. The possibility of pursuing them exists in the public interest. The courts, when called upon to exercise the supervisory role assigned to them under the Arbitration Act 1996, are acting as a branch of the state, not as a mere extension of the arbitral process. Nevertheless, they are acting in the public interest to facilitate the fairness and well-being of a consensual method of dispute resolution, and both the Rules Committee and the courts can still take into account the parties’ expectations and regarding privacy and confidentiality when agreeing to arbitrate.”

Recent commentary on UK practice stemming from City of Moscow describes the state of play this way: “[T]he starting point for arbitration claims under [UK Civil Procedures Rules], except where the court is asked to determine points of law, is that they are generally heard in private. However, this is only the starting point and the public interest must be taken into consideration in each case.” (This was observed by authors affiliated with Herbert Smith Freehills in a 2022 blog post on the Thomson Reuters Arbitration Blog dated February 4, 2022, “Privacy and Confidentiality of arbitration – related court proceedings: a culture clash”, http://arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com (last visited June 22, 2025)

The Position in Canada

In Canada, many provincial statutes grant the courts discretion to treat as confidential any document filed in a civil proceeding, and therefore to be sealed and omitted from the public record. However it is “well established that the ‘open courts principle’ is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and is essential to the proper functioning of [Canadian] democracy.” [Taseko Mines Ltd. v. Franco-Nevada  Corp., 2023 ONSC 2055 (Can LII) at para. 120]. Jurisprudence from Canada’s Supreme Court instructs federal and provincial courts to issue confidentiality-based sealing orders only where “(1) public disclosure would pose a serious risk to an important public interest, (2) no reasonably alternative measures would prevent this risk, and (3) the benefits of the order outweigh any negative effects.” [Id.].

The modern jurisprudence in Canada concerning the place of arbitration confidentiality in relation to the open courts principle is traceable to a mid-1990s case in the Ontario Superior Court known as the Pizza Pizza case. [887574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd., 1994 CarswellOnt 1214 (OSC 1994)]. In that case, the parties proceeded through arbitration knowing that — by agreement, and by arbitral and judicial orders —  it would only be confidential until the award was filed in court. After the judicial filing of the Award, the Court found that the agreement to arbitrate did not in and of itself present public policy grounds for a judicial sealing order to extend confidentiality during the course of the judicial proceedings.

The window for arguments to extend arbitral confidentiality to court proceedings related to the arbitration appears to have opened slightly in 2010, in Telesat Canada v. Boeing Satellite Systems International, Inc. [2010 ONSC 22 (Can LII)].  The sealing order made in the Telesat case strikes the chord of arbitral confidentiality as a distinct dimension of public policy.  But in Telesat the arbitration was ongoing; the court’s sealing order was made in the context of an interlocutory appeal from a procedural order concerning the admissibility of certain evidence and an alleged disqualifying bias of the Tribunal Chair. In this context, the Court stated: “In my opinion a properly limited confidentiality order would promote the use of private commercial arbitration and would thereby promote the modern approach to the autonomy of the arbitral process. It would run contrary to the public interest in favour of encouraging private dispute resolution if a party seeking procedural review under the Arbitration Act, for issues such as alleged bias or unfair treatment, could defeat the confidentiality of an on-going arbitration and thereby undo one of the critical advantages of the arbitration process.” [Id. at para. 27].

Readers in all jurisdictions will want to keep Telesat in mind when judicial proceedings other than award enforcement and annulment occur. The open courts principle has a different weight when a non-dispositive judicial adjudication is sought – and in the arbitral context this could include a wide array of proceedings including motions to compel or enjoin arbitration, to enforce arbitral subpoenas or provide other judicial support for obtaining non-party evidence, to disqualify a Tribunal or an arbitrator. Courts may be inclined to share the Telesat court’s view that where an ongoing arbitration is confidential, that confidentiality should not be disturbed where the court is acting only in an ancillary role.

In Canada there was a chance in 2017 for arbitral confidentiality as a public policy value to be extended to a final award enforcement case, in the Donato case [2249492 Ontario Inc. v. Donato, 2017 ONSC 4975 (Cal LII)] but the Court, while sounding the right notes about arbitration and public policy, was unwilling to enter a blanket confidentiality order (and there was no proposal from the sealing order applicant for a more selective restriction on access to the record). Thus the Court stated (in excerpts I condense for concision): “I accept that there is a legitimate public policy interest in encouraging private dispute resolution through arbitrations by protecting the autonomy of the arbitral process…. [However][i]f the confidentiality order sought … were to be granted simply on the ground that the court proceedings involve a private and confidential arbitration, and that the public interest favours such orders to promote arbitrations and protect the expectations of privately and confidentiality of the parties to the arbitration, the consequence would be …[the] widespread granting of sealing orders [that] could tend to diminish public confidence in the administration of justice.” [Id. at paras. 25 and 27, internal quotation marks omitted].

If Donato is a good indication, there may be considerable judicial sentiment in Canada to carry forward the confidentiality of arbitration into the judicial enforcement/vacatur process, but that indiscriminate record-sealing is a bridge too far in a country with such a well-established open courts tradition that is perceived as a fundamental attribute of a democratic legal order.

But suppose the enforcement and set aside case concerned only a single issue: alleged arbitral bias as indicated by certain instances of conduct during the proceedings by an arbitrator, and that the sealing order application contended that the judicial record was encumbered by reams of exhibits and briefs from the arbitral proceedings that had no bearing on the outcome of the enforcement case? Would a judge be less inclined in such a case to worry that granting a sealing order upon portions of the record not material to the court’s decision would nevertheless “diminish public confidence in the administration of justice”? Perhaps.

But in a recent award enforcement case in the Alberta Court of King’s Bench [Inter Pipeline Ltd. v. Teine Energy Ltd., 2024 ABKB 740 (Can LII), Dec. 5, 2024], the Court had no sympathy for the argument, as framed by the sealing order applicant, that the confidential nature of arbitration is a “public interest” factor, to which the open courts principle might yield some terrain. Unfortunately the “public interest” argument of the applicant focused on arbitration’s contribution to conservation of public judicial resources, and the court found that argument unpersuasive. On this basis the case may well be an outlier, and the Telesat case, with its reference to “protecting the autonomy of the arbitral process” may be better barometer of judicial sentiment across the Great White North.

The Position in the US Second Circuit and its New York District Courts

Recent cases concerning judicial docket sealing in arbitration cases in the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals – probably the most active federal appellate court in the US for commercial arbitrations – share a common pattern. Claimants who had prevailed in final awards in contractually-confidential employment arbitrations filed award enforcement petitions in the District Court for the Southern District of New York (mainly the Manhattan portion of New York City) and sought to have their awards and related submissions to the Court maintained on the Court’s Internet-accessible public docket even after the awards had been  promptly satisfied by the losing parties. The evident objective was for the Claimants’ counsel to recruit new claimants to bring similar arbitrations against the same Respondents based on similar grievances (thereby overcoming the class arbitration waivers the employees had signed). Unsealing the award-confirmation documents on the docket, in this situation, was seen by the Second Circuit in each case as a perverse invocation of the open courts principle, because the applicant in each instance no longer had standing to proceed with an award-confirmation action once the award had been satisfied.

It would have been sufficient, in each case, for the Court to have said only that the arbitration documents on the docket ceased to be “judicial documents” that should be public under open courts principles once the award-confirmation actions were made moot by the award debtors’ full compliance. But in each case, the Second Circuit did not stop there, but also referred to the Federal Arbitration Act as the source of a public policy favoring confidential arbitration. Thus, in In re IBM Arbitration Agreement Litigation, 76 F.4^th 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2023), the Court based its decision in part on “the FAA’s strong policy protecting the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings.”  In Stafford v. IBM, 78 F.4^th 62, 71 (2d Cir. 2023), the Court stated that “[c]onfidentiality is a paradigmatic aspect of arbitration,” and cited older cases in which the court had “affirmed decisions to keep judicial documents subject to confidentiality provisions in arbitration or settlement agreements under seal.”    The Court in Stafford referred to “the FAA’s strong policy in favor of confidentiality” and observed that “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.” Id. at 69. And in Billie v. Coverall North America, Inc., 2024 WL 4380618 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2024), the Court quoted the Stafford decision’s reference to “confidentiality [a]s a paradigmatic aspect of arbitration.”

Prospects for Evolution

Do these Second Circuit cases place us on the cusp of a new era of confidential treatment of arbitration-related matters in US district courts, or has the Court only provided an opportunistic dictum about confidentiality in cases that really stand only for the proposition that the district courts’ public dockets should not be exploited to breach arbitral confidentiality when (1) there is no genuine dispute for the courts to address, and therefore (2) there is no basis to invoke the presumption of public access to the “judicial documents” that the courts examine to make decisions?

It is probably too early to tell. In a 2024 case that involved the actively-contested confirmation of a final arbitration award, the district court rejected a proposed sealing order and, while it cited Stafford, it did not give weight to the FAA’s recognition of contractually-agreed arbitral confidentiality as a distinct public policy counterweight to open courts principles. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Arroyo, 2024 WL 3028432 at **2-4 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2024). In the most recent reported case , a US district court in New York relied on these Second Circuit cases as controlling precedents requiring that the award confirmation submissions remain under seal. But this was another no-controversy case (and therefore effectively no role for the presumption of public access): “[P]etitioner’s bid to confirm the arbitral award in unopposed…. Thus there is no need to unseal any of the documents in question to enable the public to better understand a judicial opinion resolving a contested issue arising from an arbitration.”  Chapey v. Khan, 2025 WL 1078300 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2025) (emphasis supplied).

There may be an opportunity here for the community of arbitrators and arbitration counsel to influence the direction of the courts’ practices. As a first step, confidentiality orders agreed by counsel and approved by the Tribunals could more consistently – as they often do – obligate any party making any application for judicial relief, including confirmation or vacatur of any award, to seek judicial approval for filing under seal, to file under seal initially where such filing is permitted by the district court’s rules of practice (or where this is not permitted, to commence the proceedings by making the motion for leave to file under seal), and to affirmatively support the exercise of the court’s discretion to respect arbitral confidentiality by keeping the record sealed. A confidentiality order having such specificity may tend to inhibit a common arbitration guerrilla tactic – the interlocutory filing of a lawsuit on a public docket (e.g. to enjoin the arbitration, or to assert a claim by or against a non-signatory that is allegedly non-arbitrable, or – as was true in the Chapey v. Khan case – nominal compliance with a confidentiality order obligation to file under seal, but with accompanying submissions that are, as the district court observed in agreement with Respondent’s assessment “in all but name a request to unseal”).  This obligation may be tempered by an exception that permits a party to advocate before the Court for unsealed filings where public exposure may be necessary to remedy previous breaches of the confidentiality of the arbitration by or on behalf of an adverse party that may have resulted in public dissemination of disinformation, where the party observing the obligation of confidentiality may have no other effective recourse to correct public disinformation.

Further, there could be an opportunity for district courts to develop – with support from counsel advocating a broader judicial berth for arbitral confidentiality – a more nuanced approach to the balancing of open court principles and arbitral confidentiality.

The argument(s) might go something like this:

1. Confidentiality as a “paradigm” attribute of arbitration, protected by the FAA at least where it is expressly adopted by agreement of the Parties, loses much of its value in attracting parties to arbitration if confidentiality must be sacrificed as a condition of seeking judicial relief related to the arbitration. The more judicial relief that is required, under current law and practice, the more the parties’ agreement to arbitrate privately and confidentially is denied enforcement by the courts. This judicial practice, and the principles underlying it, are effectively a federal common law limitation on the promise of FAA Section 2 and its jurisprudence that agreements to arbitrate will be enforced according to their terms (where those terms include the confidentiality of the arbitration).
2. Most commercial arbitrations do not implicate matters of broad “public interest.” They may be interesting to some narrow segment of the public, but not for reasons that are recognized within the constitutional (First Amendment) rationale for public access to judicial documents. Under existing law, only the First Amendment rationale should create a nearly unrebuttable presumption of public access to judicial proceedings. The other rationale, the common law rationale, that public access is valued to hold judges accountable for the integrity of their work and their adherence to the rule of law, should be acknowledged to be a relatively weaker presumption, one that is more amenable, as compared to the First Amendment imperative, to exceptions based on other public policy values like arbitral confidentiality.
3. As was suggested in the Telesat case in Ontario discussed above, the common law rationale for public access (monitoring judicial integrity and adherence to the rule of law) is more compelling when a court is making a final disposition, to confirm or vacate an award, and is less compelling when the court is performing a facilitative function such as enforcing an arbitral subpoena or addressing a motion affecting the scope of a sitting Tribunal’s jurisdiction over issues or persons. And the courts should particularly strive to protect the agreed-upon confidentiality of the arbitration while it is in progress, as the day when any public exposure of the case in a confirmation/vacatur context might never arrive if the case is resolved before a final award or if there is voluntary compliance with the final award. The development of case law in this area would also tend to inhibit the tactical resort to collateral judicial proceedings by a party seeking to exert settlement pressure on its adversary by public exposure through public court dockets.
4. The common law rationale for public access to judicial documents does not necessarily require instantaneous public access at the time such documents are uploaded to an electronic court docket. A confidentiality agreement of the Parties, or a procedural order of the Tribunal establishing confidentiality, if applicable prima facie to documents being filed on a court docket that is accessible to the public absent a sealing order, should be a sufficient basis for a US court asked to grant relief under the FAA to order the submissions the remain under seal at least for a period sufficient to enable the court to determine which of the documents are judicial documents because they are required for the court’s performance of its adjudicatory function. The time of such a determination often will be, but will not necessarily be, the time of an adjudication – for example, after entry of a judgment vacating, or confirming or denying confirmation of, an arbitral award. That is the time – unless there is a First Amendment interest of the public in following the proceedings as they unfold – when the integrity of the Court’s decision-making is most effectively examined, and such deferred publication would enable courts to strike a more refined balance between open courts principles and the FAA’s protection of agreed arbitral confidentiality.
5. One salutary aspect of this approach is that a party will be discouraged from deploying excessive and unnecessary publication of arbitral documents, that do not meaningfully bear on the adjudication, as a cudgel to induce compliance with the award or acceptance of a settlement. Should either objective be achieved, there will be no adjudication, and the common law rationale for public access to arbitral documents as judicial documents will evaporate, just as it did in Stafford. The common law rationale for publication should prevail over the confidentiality that the FAA protects (either because it results from the direct agreement of the parties results indirectly from a procedural order made in the agreed arbitral process) when there has been (or at least rather clear will be, as when the matter is fully submitted) an adjudication whose legitimacy should be exposed to public examination — not when such an adjudication is merely a possibility.

I had the privilege to be a panelist at California International Arbitration Week in Los Angeles on March 11, 2025, joining a panel of distinguished colleagues in a program on award drafting presented by the International Committee of the College of Commercial Arbitrators. Below is a slightly edited and expanded version of my remarks at that event. For quite some time I have been unable to find the time to post on this site as frequently as I would like, and award drafting has been a major contributor to the drought.  I hope you will enjoy these remarks.

A reasoned award may have many audiences. So the drafter of the Award is well advised to identify those audiences and chart their objectives and agendas before she begins to write. I speak here of the drafter of the analysis sections of the Award, who may or may not also be the drafter of preliminary summaries of the proceedings and the contentions of the Parties, these being portions of the Award, if the setting calls for such preliminary summaries, the drafting of which might be delegated to a Tribunal Law Clerk acting in such a capacity with the consent of the Parties.

The first audience for the draft is of course the non-drafting members of a three-member tribunal. In an ideal world (not always the case in practice) the tribunal will have deliberated to a consensus point of view or at least a majority position on each claim for relief – as to liability, and remedy in general if not also specifically the sum of damages in a damages case. The tribunal will have discussed the need for and timing of submissions on costs, the adequacy of the parties’ submissions on all issues but particularly on issues that often are neglected by the parties such as interest (pre-award, post-award, post-judgment, at what rate(s), and with what compounding if any). Deliberations may produce ideas for remedies, especially “equitable remedies” in common law parlance, that are not fully aligned with the relief articulated in the Claimant’s submissions. The deliberation is the time when such remedies, if they appeal to the tribunal, should be formulated in sufficient detail that the tribunal might reach a decision about inviting the Parties to submit further comments on the tribunal-proposed solution. Ideally this will be at a time before the clock begins to run, under the applicable rules, for delivery of the Award. And this will be a time when the first audience, the other members of the tribunal, may have more flexibility than they might have later on to entertain remedial solutions that are not strictly within what the Parties have presented.

It may be that one or another of the non-drafting arbitrators is not quite convinced of the correct position and/or the correct reasoning on one or more issues. It may be, unfortunately, that one arbitrator is non-committal due to inadequate preparation. This ought not to happen but it can do so; and for this arbitrator the drafter’s draft may need to persuade and may need to be more heavily annotated to key portions of the record than might otherwise be felt necessary. It also occurs that the drafting arbitrator hails from a different country and a different legal culture than the non-drafters – resulting in different a priori expectations about the structuring of the award even if there is a general consensus about the outcome. This is the type of issue that the astute tribunal chair will begin to tackle early on – whether by Zoom or over lunches and dinners during hearings. Here is a good point to mention the possible utility to the drafter of inviting written case analysis outlines from the non-drafters. The time invested may enable the drafter to better appreciate the views of her colleagues, to assimilate those views into the draft, and to identify in a timely way any issues that might ultimately be a basis for a concurring or dissenting opinion. The desirability of identifying such issues at the outset of the drafting process is obvious.

Let us move along now to a few words on the audience that consists of institutions that scrutinize awards before issuance, namely, “the Boss is always right”; the Parties selected this “Boss”; and the resulting regimentation of form – Parties, Tribunal, Proceedings, Contentions – is an albatross hung about all of our necks.

As to the next audience – the Parties – in the form of a question: Is it true that we mainly write for them, and especially for the loser who, if satisfied that all of its arguments were carefully and eloquently rather than peremptorily dismissed, will be inclined to lick its wounds, comply with the award, and move on? The answer must be “sometimes.” Because it is only sometimes, and perhaps increasingly rarely, that high-stakes business and investment disputes proceed with the same equanimity between the parties as did the negotiation of the contract or underlying investment treaty.

But if you as a tribunal know from an early stage that this will be a scorched earth case, bound to be fought on to the annulment or set aside stage and even through additional appeals, is there much you would do differently? Probably not. Essentially the same effort you ought to make to address in a thorough way each of the losing party’s arguments is the baseline level of effort to be exerted to satisfy a court of primary jurisdiction that there are no grounds under its law for annulment. And one says “baseline” level of effort because it is your charge as a tribunal to be sensitive to particular standards for set aside in the primary jurisdiction court, and also to idiosyncratic grounds to refuse recognition that might infect proceedings in other places where your award may have to be brought for recognition and enforcement. By “idiosyncratic” I mean to invite Tribunals to be watchful about what happens to awards in countries that, while they may be parties to award enforcement conventions, may be hostile to awards from particular foreign jurisdictions or may be subject to influences from a losing party or its allies or proxies. Maybe this point can be summed up by saying that it will often be inadvisable to give short shrift even to weak arguments because one thinks the award is relatively immune from de novo review.

One more audience deserves mention, and that is the “public,” consisting mainly of practicing attorneys and arbitrators who might read the Award or read about the Award in publications that follow our work. If you know that the Award will be filed on a public court docket, especially one in a prominent arbitration center to which Jus Mundi applies its algorithms, or if you know that any confidentiality restrictions in  your case, whether by law, rule or order, do not prevent the Parties from making public disclosure of the Award, the tribunal should consider the award’s messaging for this broader community. This may simply take into account the fact that awards are increasingly being sought out by counsel for citation as precedent on procedural and substantive issues. But it may also entail messaging in the Award about the conduct of the Parties and their counsel, how any misconduct was treated, and how such treatment might serve as an example for other tribunals and a contribution to arbitration community discussion of evolving best practices.

Finally, two more topics: procedural fairness, and equitable relief.

There can be a temptation to write at length a recital of the procedural history of the case. But unless this is a matter of necessity in the institutional setting of the arbitration (see “the Boss is always right,” above) it is debatable whether it is worthwhile to do this in the award. It may worthwhile to do this in the preparation for writing the award, so that in a case with volumes of submissions an obscure but significant matter is not overlooked in the award. But this can be a step in preparing to write rather than in writing, unless the writing is enforced as a drafting protocol by the institution.  Where the tribunal should concentrate its energy, in regard to procedural fairness, is on the losing side’s actual procedural grievances — and these will often have been stated expressly, as in a protest against an adverse ruling on a procedural matter. Here the tribunal – while being mindful not to be seen as overly defensive by a reviewing court – may want to speak clearly and directly to the reviewing court especially if the procedural order in question did not fully articulate the tribunal’s reasons.

As to equitable relief, leave no detail unattended. Courts are not generally in the business of reading arbitral tea leaves or carrying out the spirit of an arbitral injunction by putting flesh on a skeleton. Your injunctions and orders for specific performance should be written as clear judicial mandates, offering clear standards for compliance that will leave neither the Court nor the obligor of the injunction with any arguable uncertainty about whether there has been compliance. “Enforcement granted” and “vacatur denied” should be sufficient for your equitable relief award to become a judgment for equitable relief that is readily enforced according to the powers of the enforcing court.

MY “PET PEEVE”: Unwarranted rigidity of Award format. Beyond what format contentions are imposed upon us, Award-writing should be creative not formulaic.

Today, in a first for Arbitration Commentaries since its creation in 2009, this Post is devoted to dispute resolution between the people of the United States and the Executive Branch of their federal government.

May 1, 2025 is Law Day in America, a national celebration of the Rule of Law, a day that has been dedicated to that cause since the observance was first proclaimed by President Eisenhower in 1958.

Lawyers and non-lawyers will gather in support of the Rule of Law on courthouse plazas and in town squares across the United States. More information is provided through the links below.

https://lawdayofaction.org/

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/law-day/

https://www.nycbar.org/blogs/rally-for-the-rule-of-law-thursday-may-1-at-100-p-m-in-foley-square/

Here I make a special plea to the arbitration community: not only to attend a Law Day event if you will be near to one, but to encourage your colleagues who are active members of large law firms to enable their partners, associates and staff to join the ranks of those who will attend. The turnout for these events is essential to their message.

Republished below is a message to the New York legal community about Law Day, issued on April 22 by the Executive Director of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

L