ARBITRATION COMMENTARIES

In May 2026, and again today, I have prepared a Commentary concerning the United States role in Venezuela after the removal and arrest of Nicolas Maduro during a short-duration military invasion of Venezuela by the United States. This is a subject of interest to the arbitration community for many reasons. So many of you have been involved as advocates or arbitrators in cases linked to Venezuela’s nationalizations of energy and mining interests. Some of us (not this Commentator) now have involvement as counsel in advising clients about dispute resolution aspects of new investment prospects for Venezuela. For many, the unique circumstances of the political and economic transition in Venezuela ensuing from the US military action directed by our President to remove Mr. Maduro, provide an opportunity to observe, on an ongoing basis, whether a failed State, as Venezuela evidently is, may be stabilized and revived by US diplomatic and military support for a democratically-illegitimate authoritarian regime — and whether this may be effectively done without an articulated plan for restoring democracy and rule of law, and indeed possibly with an unarticulated plan to support the post-Maduro “interim” successor regime indefinitely.

Lack of transparency is one obstacle to drawing any conclusions or making any informed predictions. But this is a subject that should interest us, and one to which our attention is drawn on an ongoing basis, because what America’s President has threatened with regard to other parts of the world — notably Cuba, Greenland, and less seriously Canada — has been implemented to a significant degree in Venezuela.  As it is said on a sign outside a theater in New York’s Theatre District: Attention Must Be Paid.

It may be too soon to assess the impact on Venezuela’s trajectory of the tragedy of the recent earthquakes. Some news media reports suggest that the relatively moderate US Government crisis response is more consistent with an underlying policy of resource exploitation than with a commitment to Venezuela’s revival. Other reports suggest that the human losses and devastation, bearing most heavily on Venezuelans with the least economic means, could galvanize public opposition to the post-Maduro US-supported regime, even though the Maduro regime’s mechanisms for suppression of dissent have not been dismantled.

It appears hat licenses granted by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) beginning within days after the apprehension of Mr. Maduro, have enabled Venezuela to achieve modest gains in oil production and revenue — relative to the stagnant situation of 2025 — with the main driver of such gains being a US-imposed system that channels sales to US-approved customers and sales proceeds to US Treasury accounts (initially, Foreign Government Deposit Funds, (“FGDFs”)) through US-approved oil traders acting as brokers. Effectively, an OFAC sanctions program that began in 2015 with an objective to restore democracy and civil society in Venezuela, to eliminate corruption and eradicate poverty, presently operates mainly to channel sales of Venezuelan crude oil inventories to customers in countries aligned with policies of the US Administration, and to filter sales proceeds through the FGDFs or other US Treasury accounts.  The FGDFs – which early on consisted mainly of an account or accounts in Qatar, but going forward may be in US Treasury accounts within the US – lack transparency because they are not systematically audited.

The FGDFs have one evidently constructive consequence: to prevent a disorderly race to attempt judicial execution upon Venezuelan cash assets by holders of Venezuela’s sovereign debt (recently estimated in the Financial Times to exceed $240 billion USD). But the lack of transparency leaves open questions about uses of the proceeds. How much goes to the traders as commission? How much goes to favored persons of the US President? Are any of the traders such persons? How much reaches favored persons in the post-Maduro regime of “interim” Venezuelan President Dulcy Rodriguez, as a means of maintaining US control? (This assessment is based on a variety of online sources, but one stands out deserving citation, a June 2026 article on the website of the Council on Foreign Relations presented by a former OFAC official: https://www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-took-over-venezuelas-oil-industry-where-has-all-the-money-gone).

But whether or not Venezuela in 2026 turns out, in retrospect, to have been a Kleptocracy dominated by the American President, Venezuela’s future — at least while its prospects for economic growth lie mainly in its natural resources — depends on new foreign investment for infrastructure to support a return to productivity levels not seen since the 1990s. Those decisions need to be made, substantially but not exclusively, by US investors, some of whom are holders of large components of Venezuela’s sovereign debt and also bear the battle scars of more than a decade of arbitrations, award enforcement cases, and litigations related to execution upon Venezuelan assets.   The outlook for dispute resolution with regard to new disputes arising from execution and performance under new contracts, at some future date if and when disputes might arise, is presumably assessed to be above the level of “normal” project risk given the dispute resolution history, the pro-Maduro legacy of the “interim” regime, the longer-term transition in US policy when a new American President takes office, and the nature and timing of any transition in Venezuela’s government with attendant risks that a new government, installed after new elections in Venezuela,  may not willingly adhere to terms of new State contracts that might be made in 2026.

Into this complex equation OFAC in June 206 inserted a new series of General Licenses. In terms of business opportunity, the new GLs generally track Licenses to conduct business in and with Venezuela that were described in the May 2026 Commentary on this site. But the June round of GLs provides a refinement of the dispute resolution options for such transactions. The new array of GLs, dated June 10, 2026, provides specific constraints on dispute resolution options, i.e. that “(i) the terms of the contract be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States and (ii) dispute resolution proceedings relating to the contract occur in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Singapore.”  This represents a minor refinement of the governing law language in the January round of General Licenses, and a significant expansion of the options for selection of a judicial forum or arbitral seat.

This prescription is accompanied by a new “FAQ”, posed and answered by OFAC:

“Does the requirement in certain Venezuela General Licenses (e.g., 46C, 47A, 48B, 50B, 51B, 52A, and 54A) that the terms of contracts be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States mean that U.S. law must govern all aspects of the underlying activity?”

“No.  Certain Venezuela general licenses (GLs) require that any contract for transactions authorized by the GL with the Government of Venezuela or certain other covered entities (e.g., Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. in GL 52A or CVG Compañía General de Minería de Venezuela CA in GL 51B) specify that the terms of the contract be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States. The GLs also require dispute resolution proceedings relating to the contract or its breach to occur in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Singapore. If the parties agree to submit their dispute to arbitration, the procedural rules applicable are those rules agreed by the parties, or the rules of internationally recognized institutions or the rules of the seat of arbitration.

“This requirement means that the laws of a state or other jurisdiction within the United States must govern questions of contract law between the parties relating to the contract, including interpretation, contractual performance obligations, breach, contractual remedies, payment obligations, termination, validity, assignment or novation, and enforceability of the contract.”

“The requirement permits the inclusion of contract terms that recognize that certain aspects of the underlying activity in Venezuela may be subject to applicable Venezuelan law and regulations, including laws and regulations governing the exercise of Venezuela’s sovereign regulatory authority, administrative permits and licenses, concessions, labor, environmental, health and safety, and other mandatory regulatory requirements.”

The comments below seek to identify some of the challenging dispute resolution issues that may be confronting decision-makers at energy and mining companies as they consider whether to embrace the opportunity OFAC’s new General Licenses offer to resume activity in Venezuela (putting aside questions that arise in the setting of any international contract about choices of arbitral seat, rules of arbitration, and the litigation v. arbitration decision itself).

As we think about what contractual terms US and foreign energy and mining firms might consider satisfactory for arbitration seated (logically but not necessarily) in the United States with regard to a contract that must be governed by the contract law of a US jurisdiction, several potential issues come to mind. Mainly these issues arise from the possibility that (1) for an indefinite period, US policy toward Venezuela will prevent rather than facilitate elections that could result in a leadership change, and (2) the US executive branch will take aggressive steps, through sanctions policies and military threats or actions, to configure Venezuelan domestic law in regard to the energy and mining sectors – especially as it impacts contract terms for new foreign investment.

1) Civil unrest resulting from perpetuation of the “interim” post-Maduro regime is a foreseeable contract risk. Future arbitral tribunals might be called upon to adjudicate disputes over impacts of such unrest on contract performance. That prospect in turn presumably affects how potential US and other foreign energy and mining sector investors frame new contracts. And that prospect may test the US approach that assumes rejuvenation of the energy and mining sectors can be meaningfully launched while the “interim” post-Maduro regime remains in power.

2) The US role in the drafting and implementation of Venezuela’s 2026 Hydrocarbons Law and its implementing regulations is an open question of potentially disputed fact. A successor government in Venezuela might in (perhaps) the most extreme challenge raise a claim that the 2026 Hydrocarbons Law is a product of economic duress related to military threat and that contract terms agreed to based on that law may be repudiated. That claim might include a challenge to the validity of the arbitration (or judicial forum selection) clause. A less exorbitant challenge by a successor government could potentially be based on a post-transition modification of the 2026 Hydrocarbons Law in a way that requires invalidation or reformation of economic terms agreed by Venezuela and its relevant State-owned enterprises under the current post-Maduro regime.  As these are concrete foreseeable risks, investors will seek to address them via contract terms that would survive a post-transition invalidation. Or perhaps  some form of political risk insurance may be discussed (what role if any for the US International Development Finance Corporation?). Or some investors may ultimately conclude that political transition in Venezuela should precede significant new investment.

3) US actions in and in the vicinity of Venezuela in the run-up to the Maduro removal mission, and since that time, have hovered on the borderline of what international law might consider to be a belligerent occupation. Whether there was such an occupation for a brief period on the date of the Maduro mission now seems less important, from the perspective of new investment in Venezuela, that what may happen in the near-to-medium term. Assuming the presence of US troops during earthquake relief efforts is temporary and that those troops in due course return to bases outside Venezuela’s land borders, there remains a risk that the US executive branch will direct another invasion and establish a more enduring presence. That might be seen as the beginning of a new period of armed conflict or possibly as a continuation of a state of armed conflict that began with US naval assaults in Venezuela’s offshore waters in 2025.

Such a belligerent occupation would potentially align with a legal position of a post-transition Venezuelan government, if and when one emerges, taken for purposes of a dispute over contract validity or performance, that foreign investment contracts made under the current regime were a product of unlawful coercion by the US acting as agent for contractors of US (or US-aligned) nationality.

4) Under New York law – probably indicative of the law in other US jurisdictions whose law might permissibly be chosen under the OFAC licenses — a contract may be voided on the grounds of economic duress where the complaining party was compelled to agree to its terms by means of a wrongful threat which precluded the exercise of its free will. However, the mere existence of financial pressure and an unequal bargaining position are insufficient to constitute economic duress. (Southern Israel Bridging Fund Two, L.P. v. Orgenesis, Inc., 245 A.D.3d 578 (1st Dep’t Jan. 22, 2026). Could it be that a “wrongful” threat to Mr. Maduro’s incumbent successor has been or will be made at some relevant point in time? Surely there is at least a material risk that such a contention might be raised by a post-transition Venezuelan sovereign if that sovereign is unsatisfied with the terms of new contracts made under the current post-Maduro regime.

5)  A complexity that is perhaps being pondered is whether US energy and mining companies that have operated or may operate in Venezuela through entities outside the US, that are domiciled in countries that have entered into bilateral investment treaties with Venezuela, are bound by the dispute resolution provisions in the June 2026 OFAC licenses. Exxon-Mobil and Conoco Phillips, for example, contracted with the State-owned Venezuelan oil and gas entity Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”) through Dutch holding companies, and arbitrated under the now-defunct Netherlands-Venezuela BIT (Venezuela “denounced” the treaty in January 2008, and a 15 year extension under a survival clause has expired). Presumably consideration is being given to use of similar investment vehicles domiciled in countries that have BITs still in force with Venezuela, such as Canada and Switzerland. And presumably thought is being given to whether dispute resolution under a potential new contract with PDVSA, if contracted in the name of (say) a Swiss holding company, should be compliant with the dispute resolution requirements of the latest round of sanctions.  One possible view of things is that the scope of US entities whose interactions with Venezuela are impacted is traceable to the initial 2015 Executive Order (No. 13692) that spawned the entire Venezuela Sanctions regime (31 CFR part 591). That Order prohibited any transactions regarding Venezuelan “property or interests in property” that would “come within the … control of any United States person….”  It is at least plausible that OFAC would consider that, from a sanctions perspective, PDVSA property that might pass through accounts of a new Swiss holding company — formed by a US investor having in mind potential future recourse to dispute resolution under the Switzerland-Venezuela BIT —  would come “within the control of” the US investor.

6) A further dispute resolution issue to be sorted out, one would suppose, is who shall be the Venezuelan contracting parties for purposes of any new contractual arrangements to be made with (directly or otherwise) US investors. From a future investment treaty arbitration vantage point, perhaps the Venezuelan State’s responsibility for the actions of PDVSA may be assumed. But not every potential contract dispute with PDVSA as a joint venture partner would necessarily be suitable for framing as a violation of a treaty right (protection against uncompensated expropriation, rights to fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security, etc.). Will the Venezuelan State accept to be a contracting party or a guarantor of PDVSA’s contractual performance and obligations? Even if the current post-Maduro government would make such undertakings, how would they be treated under US law if a dispute arises after the election of new Venezuelan leaders in an election whose outcomes are recognized as valid the United States? In this context, it is useful to have in mind that prior US court adjudications of alter ego relationships among the Venezuelan State and its State-owned enterprises in the energy and mining sectors would not be res judicata in an action between different parties and might not even be controlling precedent because they are to be decided on the particular facts and circumstances underlying the new dispute. In Crystallex International Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 333 F.Supp.2d 380, aff’d, 932 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2019), the District Court held that PDVSA was the alter ego of the Venezuelan State for purposes of execution upon a judgment obtained against the State (upon confirmation of an ICSID arbitration award), against assets nominally owned by PDVSA (shares in Delaware-domiciled CITGO). The same District Court reached the same conclusion in OI European Group B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 663 F. Supp. 3d 406 (D. Del.), aff’d, 73 F.4th 157 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 549 (2024). But in the latter case, the factual findings pertained to the period after Venezuela’s 2018 national elections, when the United States recognized the apparent winner of that election, Mr. Guaidó, as the duly-elected leader of the Venezuelan government even though Mr. Maduro did not accept those election results and remained in power. (Notably, for purposes of any future change in the array of Venezuelan leaders recognized as the Venezuelan Government by the United States, the Court held that “[t]he Guaidó Government’s acts are the pertinent acts for the alter ego analysis because the Guaidó Government is recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of Venezuela,” but added that the interactions of the Maduro Regime with PDVSA in Venezuela nevertheless could have “some relevance.” 663. F.Supp.3d at 432.). And in G&A Strategic Investments I LLC v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., 788 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2025), appeal filed sub nom. Amber Energy, Inc. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., No. 25-1789 (2d Cir. July 23, 2025), a District Court in New York City — giving emphasis to the principles that whether the presumption of separateness of a foreign sovereign and its affiliates has been rebutted should be addressed (i) “‘on a case by case basis'”), and (ii) “consider[ing] all relevant facts and historical events up to the present litigation” — held that CITGO had not been shown to be the alter ego of PDVSA.

The foregoing observations are meant only to give an indication of the complexity potentially involved in a US investor’s approach to the issue of dispute resolution strategy as a dimension of risk management in considering substantial new investment in and business collaboration with the Venezuelan State. This scenario suggests that the issue raised in the earlier May 2026 post on this site — whether the US vision of revival of Venezuela’s natural resources industries can effectively proceed while the existing post-Maduro Regime remain in control – continues to be a matter of considerable sensitivity and uncertainty.

Dear All:

For the fourth time in six years, I will ride 556 miles over seven days to raise funds for cancer research at Roswell Park in Buffalo. We begin at the southern tip of Manhattan on July 26, 2026 and finish in Niagara Falls on August 1. Many of you have supported this effort in the past and I hope you will do so again.

My intrepid life partner Cathy and our indefatigable dogs will sherpa all the way — an inn-to-inn tour of the Empire State in an all-electric vehicle. Your donations also provide them with moral support to support me in this effort.

Riding across New York State isn’t for the faint of heart. It takes courage and a commitment to something greater than oneself.

I’ve committed to cycling more than 500 miles from NYC to Niagara Falls for one reason: to end cancer. This is my opportunity to shape the future of cancer research and treatment while honoring everyone affected by cancer. It won’t be an easy journey, but with your support, I know my hard work will be worth every mile.

Funds raised through Empire State Ride fuel innovative cancer research at Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center, an institution recently awarded the highest possible rating — “Exceptional” — during its five-year Cancer Center Support Grant renewal. Every dollar raised leads to an additional $23 in funding from external grants and leads to breakthroughs that affect how we treat cancer everywhere.

Thank you for considering to support this adventure!

PLEASE USE THE LINK BELOW. You may donate anonymously if you wish — Just be sure to check the box on the Donation Page.

https://give.roswellpark.org/site/SPageNavigator/apiSearch_parts_ESR.html?first_name=Marc&last_name=Goldstein&participant_search_submit=

• Some of you are old enough to remember a famous “Aside” in a scholarly law journal: ASIDE: The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1474 (1975) (https://doi.org/10.2307/3311431 (last visited June 19, 2026)). As a disclosure in the interests of transparency: At the time of publication I was the Managing Editor of The Daily Pennsylvanian, whose offices were across the street from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. However I had no role in the publication of the article.

At a time when prominent commentators in our community are asking whether arbitrators possess sufficient powers to address disruptive misconduct by parties and their counsel, a US District Judge in New York has issued a 45-page opinion that recites a five-year history of such conduct by a party in a high-value case involving a US private equity investment in Latin America. The Court’s decision – confirming a Tribunal’s final award and denying a motion to vacate based on “evident partiality” — rejects the notion that a party may engage in such misconduct during the proceedings and then achieve an ouster of the Tribunal on the basis that the arbitrators’ displeasure constitutes unacceptable bias. I was the Chair of the Tribunal in the case.  It is a rare exception to my practice in publishing this “Blog” to feature any of my own cases. But this decision is worth sharing with you.

A Jus Mundi link, where the June 17, 2026 Opinion of the Court, and several of the Court’s prior opinions and the Tribunal’s five partial final awards can be read, is here: https://jusmundi.com/en/document/decision/en-telecom-business-solution-llc-and-latam-towers-llc-v-terra-towers-corp-tbs-management-s-a-dt-holdings-inc-jorge-hernandez-alberto-arzu-and-continental-towers-latam-holdings-ltd-memorandum-opinion-of-the-united-states-district-court-for-the-southern-district-of-new-york-confirming-and-denying-vacatur-of-final-arbitration-award-wednesday-17th-june-2026#decision_89551

This Commentary is addressed to members of the arbitration community who, like this Commentator, have seen Venezuela’s political and economic situation more or less vanish from the “headlines” in the nearly six months that have elapsed since US troops removed President Maduro and his wife from Venezuela and caused them to be transferred to New York to face federal criminal charges. But Venezuela has a particular fascination for our community, as dispute resolution has been and likely will continue to be a vital part of the equation for rebuilding Venezuela’s economy, democracy and civil society.

If you are a lawyer in a U.S. law firm with clients in the energy or mining sector who are, were, and/or could be investors in Venezuela, perhaps this is the wrong webpage for you today! You know so much more than is knowable from confidential client communications and direct negotiations with representatives of the Venezuelan regime and the Trump Administration.  That is also true if you are a lawyer in a U.S. law firm that, with the recent licensing blessing of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), may advise Venezuela on the restructuring of its foreign debt, or may sit across the table in a negotiation for such restructuring . For others, who like this Commentator, have been left in a remarkable informational gap on a matter of great importance to geopolitics and the rule of law, I invite you to read on, as I synthesize what I have been able to discern, mainly from several dozen online media sources.

1. Trajectory for Democracy in Venezuela

In the near term, there appears to be no trajectory toward democratic government in Venezuela — as minimally defined by the conducting of free and fair elections, and a transition of power to the winners of such elections.  Two positions have been articulated by the Executive Branch of the US Government, one by the President and another by the Secretary of State. Neither rendition envisions elections in the near term.

The President in a recent announcement has held out the possibility of US annexation of Venezuela as “the 51st State.” The acting President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez, who succeeded Mr. Maduro following his apprehension by US forces in the January 3, 2026 military operation, has stated publicly that the position of her government is to oppose any attempt of the United States to impose such a solution.

Within his remarks, the American President commented negatively on the Venezuelan opposition leader-in-exile Maria Machado, who prevailed by a large majority in Venezuela’s 2024 elections but was prevented from taking office my Mr. Maduro’s regime that included Ms. Rodriguez as Vice President. Ms. Machado departed Venezuela in December 2025 (in part to accept the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway) and has not returned, and in recent public statements expressed the hope that she might be able to return to Venezuela before the end of 2026. It seems implicit that she views the political and social environment in Venezuela as inhospitable under Ms. Rodriguez’s leadership.

The American Secretary of State has presented to Congress and the public a position that prioritizes the rehabilitation of Venezuela’s energy industry as a precursor to a restoration of democratic government, and he adopts the view that the current governing regime in Venezuelan is the appropriate partner of the United States, at the present time, for its plan to revitalize Venezuela’s energy sector. The Secretary of State has maintained a publicly cordial relationship with the opposition leader Ms. Machado, but has not suggested that the United States would seek to influence the current regime to permit her return from exile and her political party’s lawful participation in Venezuelan political discourse.

Under either of these articulations of United States policy, it is assumed that the Venezuelan regime led by Ms. Rodriguez, is a suitable U.S. partner notwithstanding the illegitimacy of any claim it might make to an electoral mandate.  Thus the Rodriguez Government is, for an indefinite term, an undemocratic regime acting in partnership with the US Government, and tentatively with the US energy and mining sectors, in determining the future course of natural resource development in Venezuela and distribution of wealth from that activity.

Can an economic resurgence succeed within an undemocratic State? And in examining this question, it is important consider what the US objectives truly are: to encourage new US private investment in Venezuela’s energy sector?, to resolve Venezuela’s foreign sovereign debt situation or at least that portion of it that pertains to US creditors?, to restore domestic economic conditions and civil society conditions favorably? to mitigate the plight of millions of Venezuelan refugees living outside Venezuela and heavily concentrated in the United States?

2. The Venezuela Investment Outlook as Seen by “Big Oil”

ExxonMobil:  ExxonMobil’s widely-publicized statement in January 2026 that Venezuela was “uninvestable” despite the US Government intervention has more recently been adjusted by more measured remarks from the Company’s CEO. In early May, the Company’s CEO stated in an earnings call that he “feel[s] positive about what’s happening, the opportunity there,” adding that the Company is “uniquely positioned [to] play an important role” in bringing Venezuela’s oil reserves to market. (This evidently refers at least in part to ExxonMobil’s US-located refining capacity for “heavy” and “sour” crude oil). But even considered most optimistically, these remarks appeared to connote that ExxonMobil is open to being persuaded that Venezuela is “investable,” not that it has drawn a conclusion that this is so.

As this Post reached its publication date, news reports surfaced that ExxonMobil was in serious negotiations with Venezuela to return as a producer of Venezuela’s heavy crude. One wonders whether the commercial logic of high market prices and adaptable refining capacity is sufficient to entice ExxonMobil to return without further democratic reforms, rule of law advances, and clear solutions for Venezuela’s Award/Judgment debt to the company. The most recent reports in the financial press hint at a possible solution whereby ExxonMobil’s judgment creditor position might be satisfied to some degree by restoring ownership of expropriated assets.

Meanwhile, on April 7, 2026, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the District Court’s judgment enforcing under the ICSID Convention an ICSID Award made in October 2014 in favor of the Company’s Mobil Cerro Negro affiliate for $1.6 billion plus interest. See Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2025 WL 2758226 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2025), aff’d mem., 2026 WL  1042154 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2026). ExxonMobil is evidently not among the judgment creditors of Venezuela who seek to have satisfaction from proceeds of a sale of Citgo, the U.S.-based refinery and retail subsidiary of Venezuela’s state-owned oil entity PDVSA. According to the District Court judgment approving a sale of Citgo to a bidder in a Court-supervised auction — presently unconsummated while an appeal to the US Third Circuit Court of Appeals runs its course — judgment creditors holding about $5.5 billion, out of the $20 billion of judgment creditor claims for which orders of attachment were made against Citgo USA, stand to be satisfied when and if that asset sale is consummated. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2025 WL 3281353 (D. Del. Nov. 25, 2025), appeal filed, Case No. 25-3564 (3d Cir. Dec. 29, 2025).

Still, there is no clear evidence on the public record on what role in ExxonMobil’s investment assessment will be played by Venezuela’s movement away from authoritarian and undemocratic government. CAVEAT: The US Executive Branch via the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control stated on March 18, 2026, that “[a] specific license will be required before any sale is executed in the Crystallex case.”

Chevron: In recent weeks, Chevron has agreed with PDVSA on what the oil industry media refer to as “asset swap deals.” It is unclear (and perhaps doubtful) that these deals involve significant new capital investment by Chevron or that they may be taken as a leading indicator of forthcoming new capital investment by Chevron or others. Chevron’s recent history in Venezuela sets is apart from its US competitors. Unlike ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, Chevron elected to continue its operations in Venezuela after the 2007 nationalizations and thus did not follow the route of asserting expropriation claims before ICSID Tribunals (with respect to Venezuela). It is inferable, although available publications do not say so expressly, that Chevron’s physical infrastructure in Venezuela has been largely maintained and has been in continuous use — Chevron having obtained by lobbying the Trump Administration an OFAC General License to continue its operations — and that the capital investment in infrastructure repair and construction that its competitors would require is not an obstacle to Chevron for ramping up production in certain areas where operations have continued on a limited basis.

Evidently one consequence of Chevron’s ability to continue operations was that it was able to retire Venezuela/PDVSA debt to Chevron by setoffs against oil production or revenues otherwise allocable to its sovereign partners. Thus it appears that Chevron is in a materially different economic position from its competitors who have fought arbitration and award enforcement battles with Venezuela for nearly two decades. Further, the “asset swap deals” as described in online media do not appear to involve new capital investment by Chevron, but a rearrangement of percentage interests in a joint venture coupled with some favorable reallocation of producible reserves.

A full economic analysis is obviously not possible for an outsider. But the foregoing context is a reason to regard with caution any suggestions from the Trump or Rodriguez Administrations that Chevron’s activity is proof that resuscitation of the energy sector without parallel democracy/rule of law/human rights reforms is a viable approach.

ConocoPhillips:  Like ExxonMobil, and unlike Chevron, ConocoPhillips elected not to continue operations in Venezuela after the 2007 nationalizations, and was a successful Claimant in investment arbitrations, achieving now-confirmed Awards that exceed $12 billion. Unlike ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips pursued orders of attachment against the Citgo US assets, and stands to recover slightly less than $1.5 billion of that $12 billion from proceeds of the Citgo US auction IF (i) the purchase offer approved in November 2025 by the Delaware federal district court is affirmed in the Third Circuit appeal (or if the appeal were to be withdrawn), (ii) there is a closing of the judicially-approved sale, following, if still required, issuance of an OFAC license to permit the sale, and (iii) within an OFAC License if still required, proceeds are distributed in accordance with the judgment creditor satisfaction priority shown in the District Court’s opinion. Crystallex, supra, 2025 WL 3281353 at *15.

But ConocoPhillips evidently is comparable to Exxon Mobil in its caution (perhaps reluctance in the near term) about new investment in extracting and marketing Venezuelan oil and gas, albeit with more different rhetorical flourish (calling Venezuela’s recent reforms “woefully inadequate”). In public statements, ConocoPhillips’ CEO has indicated that recovery of the $12 billion is a priority over new investment, and that Venezuela’s new 2026 Hydrocarbons law and the Trump Administration’s policy openings to new investment are welcome but not sufficient conditions for new investment. ConocoPhillips evidently has not taken a public position concerning a timetable for Venezuelan elections. Neither has the Company indicated  its view of the connections (if any) of new elections, and political and civil society reform, to its Venezuela investment outlook.

Repsol:  In April 2026 the Spanish oil-gas producer/refiner Repsol reached an agreement with Venezuela and PDVSA “to regain operational control of key oil assets” and to increase production over a three-year period. Like Chevron, Repsol has continued operations in Venezuela — in the case of Repsol, through a joint venture with PDVSA since 1993.

The Spanish energy firm’s commitment agreement is a pathway for our understanding of how the Trump Administration participates in Venezuela’s post-Maduro energy industry initiatives. Under the pertinent OFAC license (No. 50A) allowing transactions with Venezuela and PDVSA by Repsol (and also by Shell, British Petroleum, Italy’s Eni, and Chevron) “monetary payments” payable to Venezuela-sanctioned entities and persons must be paid to the U.S. Treasury, for deposit into a “Foreign Government Deposit Fund” (“FGDF”) unless the Treasury Department issues different payment instructions. So if Repsol does indeed increase production as it has committed to do, if PDVSA meets its commitments to send tankers full of crude oil to Spain for refining in Repsol refineries, and if Repsol then sells the products, PDVSA’s share of those proceeds is payable to a U.S. controlled FGDF.

It bears mention here that Venezuela reportedly owes Repsol $5.4 Billion, and it is possible that Repsol and Venezuela would elect to treat PSVSA’s share of such proceeds as a retirement of debt and send no funds to the U.S. FDGF  It has also been written that at least one of the FGDFs has been established in a bank in Qatar, raising concerns about transparency of the US Government’s disposition of proceeds that may be deposited.

3. Legal Status of OFAC License Regime for the Chevron/Repsol Group

The arbitration community will watch with keen interest the evolution Venezuela’s parallel tracks of foreign debt restructuring and revival of the energy sector. Looming over this process are a series of OFAC Licenses (some General, some Specific) and the Executive Orders that enable some provisions in those Licenses. Here I examine one significant element in this equation: the OFAC License permitting transactions by the Chevron/Repsol Group as I have defined it above.

As noted above,  OFAC License 50(A) requires monetary payments due the Venezuela or PDVSA to be deposited in a Treasury Department-controlled Foreign Government Deposit Fund (“FGDF”). Essential terms and conditions of those FGDFs are established in Executive Order 14373, notably that the funds so deposited shall not be subject to lien or attachment by Venezuela/PDVSA creditors. The Executive Branch relies, for its power to intervene in this way in the availability of Venezuela assets to Venezuela creditors on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) — the same statute relied upon by the Executive Branch to impose tariffs, the same statute that was the subject of a significant interpretive ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States, in connection with the reliance on IEEPA to impose tariffs by Executive Order, on February 19, 2026. Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628 (2026).

At least two questions arise that the arbitration community will watch closely. First, what will US courts say, if asked, about the power of the Executive Branch to limit the rights that creditors of Venezuela would otherwise have under US law with respect to execution of their Judgments against Venezuela assets located in the United States? Second, insofar as the Treasury Department elects to locate FGDFs in foreign States, how does this action affect the rights of Venezuela creditors in the US legal system — notably creditors holding Judgments based on New York Convention/FAA enforcement of arbitral awards, or ICSID Convention Awards that have become US Judgments under 22 U.S.C. 1650a?

The IEEPA in pertinent text permits the President to issue Executive Orders to address “an[] unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” Arguments might be presented to a U.S. Court concerning the existence of such a threat and the scope of judicial review of the President’s threat assessment and the relationship between the threat and the adopted measures.

4.  Arbitrations Pending and Future

Public indications of pending arbitration cases against Venezuela, in the energy and mining sectors, suggest that claims valued in the tens of billions of dollars remain to be arbitrated, if settlement of those claims is not part of the debt restructuring process.

A Canadian gold and copper mining investor, already an Award creditor since 2014 based on expropriation of its interests, in 2025 filed a new BIT-based Investor-State arbitration claim alleging an estimated additional $7 billion in damages based on Venezuela’s alleged breach of a settlement agreement, relating to the unpaid obligations of that earlier Award, that contemplated a new j joint venture. As of this writing, public sources indicate that the Tribunal for that case is not yet fully constituted.

And a new arbitration under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules was filed in December 2025 by an affiliate of the oil field services firm Halliburton. The Request for Arbitration is not publicly available, but online reports suggest the damages claim may exceed $200 million.

Whether these relatively new arbitrations portend a wave of additional high-value arbitrations cannot be assessed here. But these relatively new cases do suggest that an organized multinational claims filing process, for claims arising prior to January 2026, with a fixed claim commencement deadline, might be a useful component of any overall solution to the sovereign debt predicament faced by Venezuela.

It’s worthwhile for US arbitration practitioners to consider the dispute resolution mandate of OFAC License 50A (taking that License as an example!! – This is not a survey all OFAC Licenses relating to the Venezuela energy and mining sectors issued in 2026 after the arrest of Maduro). Suppose Repsol or Chevron (or another one of the six companies to which 50A applies), through one of its joint ventures with PDVSA in which PDVSA owns at least 50%, contracts with a U.S. person to repair damaged and decommissioned FPSOs (Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Units). That contract appears to be authorized by 50A provided, inter alia, that the contract specifies “that the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States govern the contract and that any dispute resolution under the contract occur in the United States.”

How will this impact the market? Will there be an uptick in U.S. energy service provider contracts related to Venezuela that stipulate state or federal court jurisdiction in the U.S. ?  Will such contracts broadly provide for international arbitration (and mediation/conciliation if any) at a U.S. seat? Or will some service provider contract work be redirected based in part on this dispute resolution mandate to non-U.S. service providers?  What can be observed, with some confidence, is that the dispute resolution situation inherited from the Chavez-Maduro years will be ousted: U.S. service providers in OFAC 50A contracts will not, indeed may not, contract for resort to Venezuelan courts under Venezuelan law, with further recourse if possible to Investor-State arbitration if Venezuelan courts did not provide relief.

Caveat to the above: Well beyond the scope of this Blog Post is the subject of so-called “secondary sanctions” upon non-US persons for conduct outside the scope of a license granted for U.S. persons. Whether non-US service providers would err in favor in U.S. dispute resolution clauses, or whether OFAC would consider that such decisions are required, is beyond the scope of this Post.

5. Arbitration Under New Joint Ventures With And Licenses to Returning Investors ?

Within a few days after the departure of Mr. Maduro, Venezuela unveiled a new Hydrocarbons Law designed to attract new energy sector investment, and re-investment by U.S. companies like ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips that discontinued operations and pursued expropriation claims after the Maduro-era nationalizations. The possibility of international arbitration for new joint ventures between such investors and PDVSA (or even perhaps direct concessions/licenses to foreign firms) has been held out by Venezuela —  with the proviso that details concerning the terms on which Venezuela might be willing to accept arbitration will be contained in guidelines to be issued by the Ministry of Hydrocarbons.

Nearly six months later, evidently no such guidelines have been issued, although Venezuela’s Minister of Hydrocarbons has made public hints in recent days to an industry audience in Houston that arbitration seated outside Venezuela might be accepted.

How dispute resolution will figure in new investment decisions by US and other foreign investors remains to be seen. But many of us in the arbitration community will watch the evolution of the formally offered dispute resolution frameworks closely, believing that at least some decision-makers and advisers within the energy companies invited to invest/reinvest will be strongly influenced by the legacy of unsatisfied awards and judgments .

Perhaps even more difficult to assess is whether even a satisfactory dispute resolution framework will be sufficient to induce reinvestment and new investment while Venezuela remains governed by successors to Mr. Maduro who were actors within the Maduro regime prior to his departure and have not stood for election since then.  Dispute resolution lawyers advising such potential investors are sensitive to the fact that judicial support for (or non-intervention in) the arbitral process by courts of the State where business operation of the investing party occur is a significant consideration, if not on par with the choice of the seat then perhaps not far behind.

The reinvestment-first-democracy-later approach of the U.S. Government’s Executive Branch at this time of this writing will endure stress tests in investor decisions in the coming months.

In a Commentary on this site posted March 23, 2026, I referred to a recent UK Court of Appeal decision concerning the powers of UK courts under the UK Arbitration Act to enforce the “peremptory orders” of UK-seated arbitral tribunals. Tecnimont S.p.A. and LLC MT Russia v. LLC EuroChem North-West, [2026] EWCA 5 (available on JusMundi). That case arose in the geo-political context of a commercial arbitration involving entities and persons affected by UK and EU sanctions against Russia. These sanctioned parties, despite having agreed to arbitrate in “Western” venues like London, under “Western” arbitration rules like the ICC Rules, have availed themselves of Russian legislation that declares the exclusive forum for such disputes to be the Arbitrazh Courts of Russia. The UK Court of Appeal judgment in the Tecnimont case effectively endorsed a three-step process for “antisuit” injunctive relief against such Russian court proceedings: (1) a successful application to the UK-seated arbitral tribunal for antisuit injunctive relief in the form of an order directing the Respondents participating as Claimants in the corresponding Russian cases to discontinue them (and refrain from seeking to enforce outside of Russia the judgments obtained in their favor), (2) when there has been no compliance with the initial order giving such directions, the issuance of a peremptory order by the Tribunal ordering compliance by a date certain, and (3) after the deadline for compliance has passed unheeded, an application to the UK High Court of Justice, made by the Tribunal or by a party with leave of the Tribunal, for enforcement of the peremptory order.  (The Judgment of the High Court of Justice in the Tecnimont case can also be found on JusMundi. Its UK citation is [2025] EWHC 3151).

In today’s Commentary I raise a different set of issues about the “peremptory order” framework for judicial support of case management by international arbitral tribunals: Are there good reasons supporting the adoption in the United States of a similar mechanism for use by US-seated tribunals?  I raise this question not because the US lacks effective legal tools for arbitrators who may face the Arbitrazh Court challenge from US-sanctioned Russia-related parties. Such tools exist,  generally speaking, because arbitration rules typically selected in US-seated arbitrations permit (i) interim relief including antisuit relief to be granted by tribunals in the form of a Partial/Interim Award, or (ii) direct access to the US courts may be had for such antisuit relief even after the Tribunal is constituted. Also, in the US  the party may present the Partial/Interim Award granting arbitral antisuit relief to a US District Court at the seat of arbitration for accelerated judicial enforcement through the federal motion practice procedure. What is missing in the US setting is a procedural device that a US-seated tribunal may deploy to trigger similarly accelerated judicial enforcement of arbitral procedural orders that are not regarded as awards under US law and cannot be reviewed as awards under the Federal Arbitration Act even if so denominated by the Tribunal. (Under US arbitration law whether there has been an “Award” depends on the substance not the label).

The UK is not the only major common law home to international arbitrations that provides for some judicial enforceability of arbitral procedural orders. A quick survey reveals that such relief is obtainable, for example, in Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and Québec. The arbitration laws of many other major jurisdictions provide for judicial enforcement of arbitral interim measures, without requiring (as the US does through FAA case law) that such measures be adopted in a ruling that can be considered to be an Interim or Partial Award.  Is the United States, which hosts a considerable number of significant international arbitrations marred by serial non-compliance with arbitral procedural orders by recalcitrant parties, ready for and even in need of a “peremptory order” process, and if so how might it be enacted?

A Primer on the UK Peremptory Order Framework

US practitioners should appreciate that the peremptory orders permitted by the UK Act are not confined to what we consider as traditional categories of interim measures that may, in the discretion of a tribunal under institutional rules often used in US seated cases, be issued in the form of an Award. Section 41(5) of the UK Act states:

“If without sufficient showing of cause a party fails to comply with any order or directions of the tribunal, the tribunal may make a peremptory order to the same effect, prescribing the time for compliance with it as the tribunal considers appropriate.”   (emphasis supplied).

Section 41(5) builds upon section 41(1) — the first sub-section of Section 41 entitled  “Powers of tribunal in case of party’s default.” S. 41(5) states:

“The parties are free to agree on the powers of the Tribunal in case of a party’s failure to do something necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitration.”

Section 41(7) then provides authority for the Tribunal to adopt the types of remedial measures for non-compliance that are familiar to US practitioners and embedded in the rules of US providers: preclusion orders, costs orders, adverse inferences. But the ability of the tribunal to adopt such remedies is expressly stated in S. 41(7) to be “without prejudice to section 42 (enforcement by court of peremptory orders)“. (emphasis supplied).

Section 42 of the UK Act, entitled “Enforcement of peremptory orders of tribunal or emergency arbitrator” states:

(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the court may make an order requiring a party to comply with a peremptory order made by the tribunal or (as the case may be) the emergency arbitrator.

(2) An application for an order under this section may be made—

(a)  by the tribunal or the emergency arbitrator (upon notice to the parties),

(b) by a party to the arbitral proceedings with the permission of the tribunal or the emergency arbitrator (and upon notice to the other parties), or

(c) where the parties have agreed that the powers of the court under this section shall be available.

(3) The court shall not act unless it is satisfied that the applicant has exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of failure to comply with the peremptory order.

(4)  No order shall be made under this section unless the court is satisfied that the person to whom the peremptory order was directed has failed to comply with it within the time prescribed in the order or, if no time was prescribed, within a reasonable time.

(5) The leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section.

Thus the UK arbitration statutory scheme, where applicable, creates the possibility for judicial support for arbitral tribunals, in addressing uncooperative conduct of recalcitrant parties, that is a missing feature of US-seated arbitrations. How often resort to the UK courts is had in this fashion to discipline non-compliance with peremptory orders on matters more mundane than those implicated in Tecnimont is unclear; online newsletters from UK law firms commenting on that case suggest that use of the peremptory order enforcement process is infrequent. To be sure, Section 42 exhibits features that discourage its overuse and diminish the risk of greatly expanded ongoing judicial involvement in arbitration proceedings: the Court’s power to enforce a peremptory order is permissive not required, and a party may not proceed without leave of the tribunal unless there is an underlying mutual agreement of the parties to use this procedure. Also, the requirement that the applicant shall have “exhausted any arbitral process in respect of failure to comply with the peremptory order” may be deployed by the UK courts to screen out some applications. But the “without prejudice” language in section 41(7) (see quotation above), and the permissive language of that section (“the tribunal may do any of the following….”)  indicate that section 42 (3) “exhaustion of arbitral process” does not mean that a Tribunal must first deploy the section 41(7) powers and find them to be inadequate.  This reading is reinforced in the Judgment given by the High Court of Justice in the Tecnimont case, where section 42(3) exhaustion was addressed in a single sentence [at para. 32]: “In relation to the requirement of section 42(3), I am satisfied that there is no further arbitral process available to the Claimants to enforce POs 18 or 22 or 23, or otherwise to restrain [Respondent].” (emphasis supplied). Thus “arbitral process” was understood to mean a procedure within the arbitration, not a remedy available to the Tribunal as a consequence of the non-compliance. Section 42(3) is to be understood as allowing the possibility that the arbitration rules adopted by the parties, or specific procedural directions adopted by the Tribunal, mandate that some step beyond issuance of the peremptory order be taken within the arbitration before a peremptory order may become ripe for judicial enforcement.

It is likely true that drafters of the UK Act fashioned Sections 41 and 42 in part to address judicial enforceability of arbitral interim measures orders in cases under the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules, having in mind that LCIA Rules, unlike many other institutional rules, do not provide for tribunals to grant interim relief in the form of a Partial/Interim Award. (See Art. 25.1 of the LCIA Rules, and compare, e.g., Art. 28.1 of the ICC Rules, Art. 27.2 of the ICDR Rules, Rule R-38(b) of the AAA Commercial Rules; Art. 45.1 of the SIAC Rules). But the statute clearly brings within its scope “any order or directions of the tribunal” (emphasis supplied) and leaves further limitation on judicial relief to the discretion of the Court.

Adoption into US arbitration law of a comparable peremptory order enforceability scheme would fill an enforcement gap for US-seated arbitrations unrelated to interim measures: potential judicial enforceability of arbitration procedural orders that would not, under FAA jurisprudence, qualify as Awards entitled to judicial enforcement, even if denominated as such by the tribunal, because they do not, unlike arbitral interim measures in many instances, finally and definitively resolve, without potential further action by the arbitral tribunal, a separate independent claim or a dispute that is time-sensitive, separable from the merits, and/or instrumental to the effectiveness of the final relief sought. [As to this dimension of the FAA jurisprudence on finality of Partial/Interim Awards, see, e.g., Arrowhead Global Solutions, Inc. v. Datapath, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 39, 43-44 (4th Cir. 2006); GEM Yield Bahamas Ltd. v. Mullen Technologies, Inc., 2024 WL 2959259 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2024); Van Andel v. Lindberg, 732 F. Supp.3d 476, 482-83 (M.D.N.C. 2024); Ecopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Expl. & Prod. LLC, 46 F. Supp.3d 327, 336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); CE Int’l Resources Holdings v. S.A. Minerals Ltd. Partnership, 2012 WL 6178326 at **2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2013).]

Fitting A Peremptory Order Process Into US Arbitration Law

The Federal Arbitration Act in the US is by design not a prescriptive statute for the conduct of US-seated arbitrations, with the exception of its provision (Chap. 1 Section 7) concerning issuance of witness summonses by arbitral tribunals. As a practical matter, if a peremptory order process were to be adopted, it would be at the level of State arbitration legislation in States that frequently host international arbitrations, e.g. New York, Florida, Texas and California.  In this section I address two questions. First, would enforcement of peremptory orders in a US District Court at the seat of international arbitration be “an action or proceeding falling under the [New York or Panama] Convention” and thus within such a Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under FAA Chapter Two?  Second, would such an innovation in international arbitration law of individual States be pre-empted by the FAA, on the basis that the federal statute limits judicial involvement to enforcement of awards, arbitration agreements, and witness summonses issued by tribunals?

A good case can be made that federal subject matter jurisdiction to provide such relief would exist under FAA Chapter 2.  It is well settled that judicial interim measures based on state law, in support of arbitration, may be granted under FAA Chapter Two and that the application for such relief is properly viewed as an “action or proceeding falling under the [New York] Convention,” within Section 203. See, e.g., Stemcor USA Inc. v. Cia Siderurgica do Para Cosipar, 927 F.3d 906, 907-11 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding subject matter jurisdiction under the Convention over application for a pre-award attachment based on Louisiana attachment statute); E.A.S.T., Inc. of Stamford v. M/V Alaia, 876 F.2d 1168, 1173 (5th Cir. 1989) (same, in setting of maritime attachment);  Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods., 919 F.2d 822, 836 (2d Cir. 1990) (jurisdiction over preliminary injunction in aid of arbitration was proper because the remedy sought did not seek to “bypass arbitration”). By extension, federal appellate courts have held in recent years that subject matter jurisdiction exists under FAA Chapter Two, when the District Court has “primary jurisdiction” in a US-seated case, for “‘necessary ancillary proceedings that ensure the proper functioning of the underlying arbitration'”. See Molecular Dynamics, Ltd. v. Spectrum Dynamics Medical Ltd., 143 F.4th 70, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2025), quoting from Jones Day v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, 42 F.4th 1131, 1139  (9th Cir. 2022). Accord, CollegeStreet Import & Export (Tinajin) Co. v. Loyalist, LLC, 2025 WL 4660646 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2025).

If these cases are understood to stand for the principle that subject matter jurisdiction exists under Chapter 2 to enforce state law measures that backstop the procedural powers of the arbitrators to which the parties have agreed, then a peremptory order process adopted into State arbitration law would appear to be just such a measure.

Some federal court decisions in FAA Chapter 2 award enforcement cases have referred to state international arbitration statute standards concerning issues not addressed in the FAA. For example, in Carlton Energy Group, LLC v. Cliveden Petroleum Co., 2023 WL 168754 at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2023), the District Court in addressing a motion to vacate in part a Convention Award made in the United States at a seat in Houston, Texas, referred to the Texas International Arbitration Act as a source of arbitral discretion to award costs and fees to a prevailing party. District Courts in Florida have characterized the Florida International Commercial Arbitration Act “as a gap filler to the [New York] Convention for a federal court sitting in primary jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Dominicana Renovables, S.L., v. Dominican Republic, 2022 WL 521191 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb.12, 2022); Sural (Barbados) Ltd. V. Republic of Trinidad, 2016 WL 4264061 at *4 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2016).  A U.S. District Court in Chicago similarly referred to the Illinois International Commercial Arbitration Act as “essentially a gap-filling law.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. BCS Ins. Co., 239 F.Supp.2d 812, 8116 (N.D. Ill. 2003).

This notion of State arbitration law “filling gaps” where the FAA takes no position – and there are many such gaps — appears to be consistent with the federal courts’ approach to FAA pre-emption.  Recent federal district court decisions from California helpfully condense FAA pre-emption jurisprudence from the US Supreme Court into two categories: first, an “equal treatment principle” positing that the FAA preempts state laws that disfavor arbitration by adopting legal rules about contract enforceability that apply only in the arbitration setting or derive their meaning from the fact that an arbitration agreement is at issue, and second, an “obstacle preemption” principle that requires FAA preemption of state laws that stand as an obstacle to the achievement of the purposes and objectives of the FAA. See, e.g., Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc., 755 F.Supp.3d 1200, 1211-12 (N.D. Cal. 2024); Belyea v. GreenSky, Inc., 637 F. Supp.3d 745, 755-56 (N.D. Cal. 2022). The proposed authorization of judicial enforcement of peremptory arbitral orders does not disfavor enforcement of arbitration agreements. It would operate only with respect to arbitration agreements that make applicable state arbitration laws providing for such a procedure (usually because, as State international arbitration laws provide, they are applicable if the parties have agreed to a seat of arbitration in that State).

Preemption would seem to be an issue, if at all, only if “obstacle preemption” applies — and then only if it were established that one of the objectives of the FAA was to confine judicial involvement in arbitrations to enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements (and to make arbitral subpoenas judicially enforceable). But the extension of FAA subject matter jurisdiction to “necessary ancillary proceedings” such as pre-award attachment of assets, injunctions in aid of arbitration and enforcement of arbitral witness summonses appears to disfavor such a narrow view of the FAA’s objections. Indeed the adoption by a number of states of international arbitration statutes based on the UNCITRAL Model Law (e.g. Texas, Florida, Georgia) is evidently based on the premise that the FAA does not “preempt the field” of international arbitration. Moreover, once the parties have adopted a state law-endorsed procedure for application in their arbitration, and the procedure is not in direct conflict with a provision of the FAA that the parties may not vary by agreement, the FAA’s objective of giving effect to arbitration on the parties’ chosen terms would appear to weigh against a finding of FAA preemption. Cases holding that state arbitration law does not apply due to FAA pre-emption, on the other hand, are typically cases where a losing party sought award vacatur under state arbitration law standards more favorable to the vacatur applicant than the FAA. See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. OCELTIP Aviation Pty., 451 F.Supp.3d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 2020), aff’d, 31 F.4th 1323 (5th Cir. 2022), cert denied, 143 S.Ct. 577 (2023).

Reasons State International Arbitration Laws Might Adopt a Peremptory Order Process

There are several reasons why the peremptory order procedure may be attractive to parties that regularly select US seats for their international arbitrations. It follows that such reasons might appeal to State legislatures, as innovations that would make their States more attractive for selection as US seats for international arbitration:

1. In regard to interim measures, there may be several reasons why a Tribunal would be reluctant to provide the measures in the form of an Award. Tribunals often prefer not to relinquish a degree of procedural control by issuing a ruling that the parties obligated to comply would have an immediate legal right to challenge by a petition to vacate in a federal court. The vacatur petition may make the existence of a confidential arbitration non-confidential, with the federal proceedings becoming a spectacle played out in online legal news media. The party applying for vacatur may ask the court to stay the arbitration. The Tribunal may wish to have flexibility to modify or supplement the interim measures granted and may be reluctant to fuel any argument that it has become functus officio as to some subject matter by making a Partial/Interim Award. Under the UK model of the peremptory order process, the tribunal generally retains control over judicial involvement, as the options for judicial enforcement proceedings are mainly (i) for the tribunal to apply to the Court for enforcement, or (ii) for the applicant for the measure to apply to the Court with leave of the tribunal (unless the Parties have mutually agreed in advance to the judicial enforcement process as a matter of right).
2. An Award may only properly be made to be binding upon and enforceable against parties over whom the Tribunal has jurisdiction. If certain parties who are potential addressees of the ruling have objected to jurisdiction but have accepted that the objection should be determined in the Final Award or some other later stage, the tribunal must either accelerate ruling on the jurisdiction objection or confine its Interim (or Partial) Award to parties who have not objected. Parties who have made such objections but agreed to participate in the arbitration without prejudice will have explicitly agreed (such as in procedural order on consent joining the jurisdiction objection to the merits), or arguably otherwise agreed by implication, to be subject to the tribunal’s procedural powers for so long as they are participants. Indeed the UK Court of Appeal held in S3D Interactive, Inc. v. Oovee Ltd., [2022] EWCA Civ. 1665, that a peremptory order under Arbitration Act Section 42 was enforceable against a party objecting to arbitral jurisdiction for the duration of its participation in the arbitration.
3. Some significant procedural orders are purely procedural, and not sensibly denominated as Awards, and yet their judicial enforceability in the tribunal’s discretion may enhance efficiency and efficacy. Presumably this is why the UK Arbitration Act provided for peremptory order enforceability as to “any order or direction” even though the evident main target was interim measures that would be in Order form not Award form under LCIA Rules Art. 25.1 An order for production of evidence, or that requires the testimonial appearance of a particular witness who is a party or is within the party’s control, are good examples. If unexcused non-compliance with such an order may be an early indication that the offending party will deploy all available means to resist any adverse merits outcome, substantial time and cost may be saved if that strategy can be put to an early test by placing that order before a Court that has a full panoply of civil and criminal contempt remedies at its disposal.
4. Arbitrators may regard arbitral remedies for non-compliance as inadequate. An interim cost-shifting order awarding costs to the prevailing party on a procedural dispute may not secure compliance if the amount to be paid is not large enough to affect party conduct. A judicial contempt sanction involving an escalating daily amount for continued non-compliance, backed also by the potential for coercive civil confinement, may be much more effective. In situations involving non-production of evidence or required disclosure, tribunals may wish to have the judicial enforcement option to coerce performance of the obligation, rather than be forced to rely on adverse inferences, in combination with evidence from only one side, in deciding merits issues.
5. Some applicable arbitration rules may require that an evidentiary hearing be conducted, unless waived, with respect to any issues to be resolved in an Award whether Partial or Final. Busy Tribunals can find it difficult to schedule on short notice evidentiary hearings or even oral arguments – based on their own full calendars and aggravated by the scheduling non-cooperation sometimes deployed by recalcitrant parties. A non-Award ruling based on written submissions will in practice be a tempting solution where there is felt to be an urgency for some relief to be given, and it is regrettable that in the US setting this may be at the sacrifice of the effectiveness of the measures adopted. Judicially enforceable peremptory orders, on the other hand, can as a practical matter accelerate the adoption of coercive sanctions by courts and also shift some of the time-cost burden of party disobedience to those courts in the initial discretion of the tribunal and at the further discretion of the Court.

Closing Observation

I believe we can have some confidence that there should be no FAA jurisdiction or preemption obstacles should a State legislature at a vital US international arbitration seat elect to adopt a version of the UK peremptory order scheme into its statutory law on international arbitration. Whether there is an appetite in the arbitration community for such an innovation is a separate matter. I have sought here to identify some of the reasons why such a device would enhance the case management toolkit for US seated tribunals in a constructive way.

Interested in Submitted a Comment? – Email me at Goldstein@lexmarc.us, or post a comment to the LinkedIn announcement of this post. The “comment” function on this site has been disabled due to misuse by the uninvited/unwelcome!

On March 12, 2026, I had the privilege of being a panelist in a one-hour program during California International Arbitration Week, in San Francisco, whose subject matter was broadly the impact on international arbitration of economic sanctions such as – but not limited to – those imposed by the USA, Canada, the EU and Switzerland against Russia.  And in the case of Russia, sanctions within the scope of our panel’s coverage included, but were not limited to, sanctions imposed as a consequence of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine that began in February 2022. Our subject was indeed quite broad, and included the impact of such sanctions on the ability of certain persons, whether sanctioned or not, to secure legal representation, and the ability of international arbitrators and arbitral institutions to accept funds from such persons. Necessarily in the context of a one-hour program, not all of the many important subjects could attract the attention they deserve. Here I take the liberty of addressing one such subject: jurisdictional conflict between Russian courts, on the one hand, and arbitral tribunals seated outside of Russia, on the other, in which at least one of the parties to the arbitration is the Russian Federation or a person/entity whose conduct is impacted by economic sanctions against a Russian person/entity.

As a disclaimer to what follows: I have no involvement as an arbitrator, mediator,  advocate or otherwise, in any cases of the type discussed in this Post.

I take the liberty here of summarizing the issue by quoting from a recent publication by an international law firm based in Germany, bearing a date December 4, 2025: “Before Russian state courts there is currently a stable trend to apply Article 248.1 of the Russian Code of Commercial Procedure (hereinafter the “Russian Code”) to override choice of court and arbitration agreements.  If a Russian party files contractual claims against a European counterparty, a Russian state court will declare itself competent to hear the dispute. Russian state courts routinely reject objections by European parties arguing that the claim should be dismissed without a hearing on the merits, due to the existence of an arbitration agreement designating an institution located outside Russia… Instead, courts proceed to hear the case on the merits, relying on Article 248.1 of the Russian Code.” [Overriding of Arbitration/Choice of Court Agreements in Russia – Procedural Solutions and Potential Impediments, www.advant-beiten.com, last visited March 23, 2026].  I would add here only two further introductory points:  that US parties have also been impacted in regard to enforceability of arbitration agreements and forum selection clauses, and that the Russian legislation adopting Article 248.1 dates from 2020, and thus is not legislation adopted in response to  sanctions specific to the Ukraine war, although the frequency of resort to the Artitrazh Court in Russia (which has divisions at least in Moscow and St. Petersburg) evidently has increased significantly since the outbreak of that war.  There is some important US court jurisprudence.  I do not cover it in this Post.

I will take one prominent and current, and partially public, case as a vehicle for discussion. It is formally titled Technimont S.p.A. and LLC MT Russia v. LLC EuroChem North-West, and in its arbitral configuration this is a London-seated ICC arbitration. A chronology of arbitration and judicial proceedings including full text judgments of the UK and Arbitrazh Courts is accessible on JusMundi. I will summarize, taking some liberties to simplify matters, as follows: An Italian construction contractor and its Russian affiliate enter into an EPC contract with a Russian counterparty for the development of an energy production facility in the vicinity of St. Petersburg. In 2022 after the onset of the Ukraine war, these parties commence an ICC arbitration under the arbitration agreement in their EPC contract, and seek to enforce their right to terminate the contract on the basis, inter alia, that EU sanctions imposed as a consequence of the war prevent its further performance and permit termination. The Russian counterparty avails itself of Article 248.1 to present the same termination dispute, and its counterclaim for damages for alleged unlawful repudiation of the EPC Contract, to the Arbitrazh Court in St. Petersburg. The Claimants apply for and obtain from the arbitral tribunal an anti-suit injunction as an interim measure, to enjoin the Russian counterparty from prosecution of the Arbitrazh Court case. The Russian counterparty proceeds with its case in St. Petersburg in defiance of that injunction, and obtains a corresponding countermeasure in that court: an anti-arbitration injunction that directs the Technimont Claimants to cease and desist from pursuing the ICC case. When the Technimont Claimants press on with the arbitration, the Arbitrazh Court imposes a fine equivalent to the money damages claimed in the counterclaim, and eventually enters a final judgment on the merits in favor of the Russian party for that sum, and incorporates its anti-arbitration injunction in the final judgment.

Meanwhile, back in London, the Claimants secure from the arbitral tribunal a remedy permitted under the  UK Arbitration Act: a “peremptory order” – widely unfamiliar to US practitioners –whose nature is to fix a deadline for compliance with an order of the Tribunal, in default of which the order may be presented for its enforcement to the High Court in London. There was no compliance; the Technimont Claimants presented the matter on an accelerated timetable to the UK court, obtained enforcement at first instance, whereupon the Russian party challenged the enforcement order in the UK Court of Appeal, where, on an equally accelerated basis, that Court in January 2026 affirmed the enforcement order. Meanwhile, the Russian party that prevailed in the Arbitrazh Court took its Russian judgment for enforcement abroad to certain jurisdictions in which the Technimont Claimants, or their affiliates, were believed to have assets – notably including India.

According to the latest information available online, the High Court in Mumbai entered a provisional measure against assets of certain Technimont-related entities but has yet to rule on the underlying issue of the enforceability of the Russian judgment. I am not aware if the Technimont Claimants have countered in Mumbai by asking for enforcement of the judgments of the UK Courts.

As a disclaimer to what follows, I have not had access to any of the pleadings or submissions filed in the action before the High Court in Mumbai.

How might a competent court in India approach the issue of enforceability of the Arbitrazh Court Judgment? A potential starting place would be to consider the significance of any international treaty obligations owed by Russia, to whom those obligations are owed, and what should be the international consequences of any breach.

Let’s assume that each time a Russian Arbitrazh Court permits its “exclusive jurisdiction” to be invoked by the Russian Federation or by a Russian person or entity affected by sanctions, and if such a party is a party to a Treaty or contract that provides for arbitration of disputes elsewhere than in the Russian Arbitrazh Court, that there are two related violations of Treaties of which the Russian Federation is a Contracting State: the New York Convention of course, and, of considerable significance, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  The latter, in Articles 26 and 27, provides:

Article 26

“Pacta sunt servanda”

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

Article 27

Internal law and observance of treaties

A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46. (The latter not relevant here).

Let’s assume that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Arbitrazh Court violates Article II(3) of the New York Convention if a Party contesting the Court’s jurisdiction asks that the matter be referred to  arbitration under an arbitration agreement or Treaty, and the Arbitrazh Court does not grant the motion.

Let’s further assume that if the Arbitrazh Court reasons that, under Article II(3) of the Convention, the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed,” precisely because of the Russian legislation vesting jurisdiction of such cases in the Arbitrazh Court, there is a violation of Art. 27 of the VCLT: the Arbitrazh Court relies for its exercise of jurisdiction on internal Russian law as justification for failure to refer the parties to arbitration under Art. II(3) of the New York Convention.

In the case before the High Court in India, the court is asked to enforce the Arbitrazh Court judgment, and has already granted interim measures restraining assets of the Technimont Claimants and/or their affiliates. so that those assets might be available to satisfy the Arbitrazh Court judgment. India of course is also a Contracting State of the New York Convention. Is the India court’s obligation, under Art. II(3), to refer the Parties to arbitration assuming a Party asks that it do so?  Were there such a referral, then the question of enforceability of the Arbitrazh Court judgment would then revert to the arbitral tribunal that already made its own anti-suit injunction against proceedings in the Arbitrazh Court. Or is the India court obligated, under law applicable in India to its enforcement of foreign judgments, to give effect to the Arbitrazh Court’s determination of the nullity/inoperability of the relevant agreement to arbitrate at a seat of arbitration outside of Russia?

The judges of the India court would reasonably begin by having a look at what the VCLT has to say about remedies available to a non-breaching party (India) in regard to a material breach by another party (Russia) of a multilateral treaty (the New York Convention).  They would do so having in mind that Russia, and perhaps the majority of Contracting States of the New York Convention but not India are also parties to the VCLT.  Article 60 of the VCLT provides in pertinent part:

A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:

(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either:

(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or

(ii) as between all the parties;

(b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;

(c) any party other than the defaulting State to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.

There does not appear to be very much in this text that would inform the approach the India judges might adopt – even if India were a VCLT party. (Of course India’s status as a VCLT non-party, as is the United States, does not prevent India’s courts from referring to the VCLT for principles applicable to the interpretation of other treaties to which India is a Party.)  One could stretch the language of sub-part (b) above to reach the dilemma an India court now confronts. One could say that India is a New York Convention party “specially affected by the breach” by Russia, because its courts must address the enforceability in India of an Arbitrazh Court judgment. In the same stretch, it might be said that the India court is empowered to suspend the operation of the New York Convention “in part” by suspending, in its own determination under Article II(3), the operation of the “unless null and void …” clause under which the Artbitrazh Court’s exercise of jurisdiction might be claimed by the Russian party to be legitimate .  But this approach would beg the question, which seems to be the essential question, of whether the Arbitrazh Court violates Article II(3), expressly or by implication, by relying on the Russian domestic legislation establishing Arbitrazh Court jurisdiction and powers as a basis for not only (i) refusing enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate outside Russia, but also  (ii) actually enjoining the Technimont Claimants from proceeding in the foreign arbitral forum and punishing them with severe monetary contempt fines for their non-compliance.

So perhaps a big step toward the correct answer is the answer to this question: Under Art. II(3) of the New York Convention, may a court rely on domestic law that is not the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, to determine – with effect beyond the forum court’s national borders –  that the arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed”?  Art. 27 of the VCLT, quoted above, would seem to point in the direction of a prohibition on invoking domestic law under Art. II(3). But it does not appear to be conclusive. Russia might say that it did not fail to apply Art. II(3). But if II(3) is meant to require that the “unless null and void …” clause be invoked under the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, the reliance on Russian law is clearly a material breach of Art. II(3).

For guidance I turned first to that ever-accessible and occasionally trustworthy scholar of International Law: ChatGPT (in a general, not companion, version of Itself). And here was the response: “Law Applicable to Article II(3)  > Validity of the Agreement: The Convention does not explicitly define which law determines if an agreement is ‘null and void’ in Article II(3).  However, courts generally apply the law chosen by the parties to govern the contract, or in the absence of a choice, the law of the seat of arbitration, or the law of the country where the agreement was made.”  (emphasis supplied). This is not a ChatGPT hallucination, as a human examination of some of The Robot’s source material confirms. Yet the simple proposition stated is both elusive and intuitive – elusive because it does not emanate from the text of Article II(3) or even the travaux préparatoires of the Convention, and intuitive because the Convention’s purpose to harmonize globally the standards for enforcement of both arbitral awards and arbitration agreements would be frustrated, and the principle of pacta sunt servanda would be denigrated, if the “null and void…” clause in Article II(3) were governed solely by the domestic law of the State where the signatory resisting arbitration commences an action in court on an arbitrable claim.

An exceptionally well-researched 2016 article by a Turkish scholar – the lead resource cited by ChatGPT – summarizes the case for application of uniformly narrow international standards in the application of the “null and void…” clause according to the following principles:

[Bulent Tahiroglu, Interpretation of Article II(3) of the New York Convention, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/.456989#, last visited March 23, 2026].

1. The mandatory character of Article II(3)’s directive to domestic courts in Contracting States to refer the parties to arbitration — and, I would add, the centrality of that mandate to the overall scheme of the Convention — is widely seen as hostile to any interpretation based on domestic law that would convert that mandate into a broad discretionary option based on intrinsically domestic public policy criteria.

And here I would add that Russia has gone one step further, legislatively mandating that the Arbitrazh Court shall nullify the arbitration agreement by accepting jurisdiction.

2. The prevailing (albeit not unanimous) international perspective is that a domestic court requested to deny referral to arbitration under the “null and void…” clause of Article II(3) should apply a liberal prima facie standard that permits arbitration to proceed unless it is manifestly evident that the arbitration agreement is invalid. This view is informed by the widespread acceptance of the “negative” dimension of compétence-compétence, i.e. a general principle of restricted judicial intervention on a disputed issue of arbitral jurisdiction at the pre-arbitration stage as opposed to the award enforcement stage.

And here I would add that the notions of “prima facie” and “manifest” strongly imply that the invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate should be evident either of the face of the document that is presented to the Court as an arbitration agreement, or in the facts as reliably and credibly presented to the court. This is the antithesis of reliance by a domestic court on domestic law that expressly invalidates an arbitration agreement for reasons of domestic public policy.

3. No single approach to identifying the law applicable to the application of the “null and void…” clause exists, but there appear to be three principal approaches used where the contract or treaty containing the arbitration agreement itself does not make the choice with sufficient clarity: (1) a conflict of laws approach based on “national law standard,” which is to say the conflicts rules of the forum, (2) a “uniform international standard,” which is to say transnational principles of law adopted upon the view that international arbitration is an autonomous legal regime independent of national law, and (3) a “a maximum standard” that is an amalgam of (1) and (2), which is to say a national law conflict-of-laws approach influenced considerably by transnational norms.

3a. Here is it worth noting that the Turkish commentator identifies U.S. federal law as an instance of the “maximum standard”, quoting from Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 685 F.2d184, 187 (1^st Cir.1982):

“The parochial interests of the Commonwealth, or of any state, cannot be the measure of how the ‘null and void’ clause is interpreted.  Indeed, by acceding to and implementing the treaty, the federal government has insisted that not even the parochial interests of the nation may be the measure of interpretation.  Rather, the clause must be interpreted to encompass only those situations – such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver – that can be applied neutrally on an international scale.”

[Yes 1982 may seem like long ago. More recent adoptions of the Ledee formulation include Green Enters. v. Hiscox Syndicates Ltd., 68 F.4^th 662 (1^st Cir. 2023); Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279 (11^th Cir. 2015); Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355 (4^th Cir. 2012); Acab v. Chenrosa, 725 F. Supp.3d 1140, 11148-49 (S.D. Cal. 2024)].

Based on this limited excursion into the law potentially applicable to the “null and void” clause, it would appear that sound arguments can be made to a court in India that the Arbitrazh Court’s judgment in the Technimont case is based on an assertion of jurisdiction that violates Russia’s obligations under the New York Convention. But the court in India presumably will also consider: (1) India’s applicable law on the enforcement of foreign money judgments,  and (2) any special considerations arising from geopolitical ties between Russia and India.  I touch upon these elements briefly – not because they are less important, but only because they exceed the reasonable scope of today’s Post.

Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in the courts of India provides a list of certain exceptions to the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment.  Notably, in relation to the foregoing discussion, this list includes: “(a) Where it has not been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction; … [and] (c) “Where is appears on the face of the proceedings to be founded on an incorrect view of international law or a refusal to recognize the law of [India] in cases in which such law is applicable.”  Thus it appears that a good arguable case can be made for the non-enforceability of the Russian Court judgment in Technimont  (and similar Arbitrazh Court judgments that might be presented for enforcement in India) . The application of Section 13 is linked to a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between India and Russia made on October 3, 2000, formally titled in its English version “Treaty Between the Republic of India and The Russian Federation on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations Concerning Civil and Commercial Matters.” Article 3 of the treaty lists nine categories of legal assistance to which the treaty applies, the eighth of which is “recognition and enforcement of judgements, including decrees, arbitration awards and settlements.”  Article 13 of the treaty provides, however, that “[t]he requested Contracting Party may refuse legal assistance if it considers it may be prejudiced as to its sovereignty, security or public order or is in conflict with its laws or international obligations.” (emphasis supplied).

Complicating the issue of enforcement of the Arbitrazh Court judgment in India (and, if sought, enforcement of the UK Court judgments in India), is the existence of strategic partnership agreements between Russia and India, some of them of recent vintage, some of them much older, and whose legal status (as treaties under international law?) is beyond the scope of this Post. One such agreement is entitled “Declaration on Strategic Partnership Between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation” and bears the date October 3, 2000, i.e. the same date as the Legal Assistance Treaty discussed above. For a contemporary view of the status of Russia-India relations, one may examine a Government of India Press Information Bureau document dated December 4, 2025 and entitled “From Strategic Partnership to Special and Privileged Bond: India-Russia Relations at a Glance (https://static.pib.gov.in, last visited March 23, 2026).  At least it must be said that the situation in India as to treaty obligations and public policy positions is less than clear, and the result indicated by analysis of obligations under New York Convention might  not necessarily be predictive of the eventual outcome.